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I. INTRODUCTION
Buda, Texas—a small town that lies between Austin and San Antonio, 
on the banks of Onion Creek and above the Edwards Aquifer—is perhaps 
best known, though it is not particularly well known, as the “Wiener Dog 
Capital of Texas.”1  Buda’s claim to this title is based upon its annual 
dachshund races, which are opposed by the Dachshund Club of America 
but lauded by locals, tourists, and the international press as an “event that 
combines the pageantry of the Kentucky Derby and the excitement of 
NASCAR with dachshunds, animals known for their small stature.”2 Buda 
is certainly unusual in relying so heavily upon dachshunds for tourism revenue, 
but wiener dogs aside, Buda has much in common with other American 
communities, especially those in many western and some southern states.
For example, as part of the fastest growing county in Texas, Buda has 
seen explosive growth of more than 80% in the last decade3—growth that
has taxed many civic and natural resources, including the community’s water 
supply. And like many fast growing American communities, Buda’s residents 
and businesses have had to reckon with the stresses of development on 
dwindling water supplies while also confronting the impacts of climate 
change4 and recent extreme weather events.5 
1. E.g., BUDA LIONS CLUB, budalions.com [https://perma.cc/7Z46-RGLU] (listing, 
inter alia, local wiener dog-friendly lodging information and providing links to photos of 
past competitions). 
2. Moses Leos III, 20 Years Strong: Wiener Race Success Grows from Short Scamper 
to National Event, HAYS FREE PRESS NEWS-DISPATCH (May 3, 2017), https://haysfree 
press.com/2017/05/03/20-years-strong-wiener-race [https://perma.cc/HR68-8MKJ]; see also
Dachshund Racing: Dogs in a Hurry, ECONOMIST (Apr. 30, 2009), https://www.economist. 
com/united-states/2009/04/30/dogs-in-a-hurry [https://perma.cc/2JE2-ULCF] (describing
the event and noting the Dachshund Club of America’s opposition). 
 3. Kalyn Norwood, Boomtown: Kyle and Buda Grow More Than 80 Percent as Austin’s 
Growth Spills Over, KVUE (Jan. 7, 2019, 11:47 AM), www.kvue.com/article/news/local/ 
boomtown-kyle-and-buda-grow-more-than-80-percent-as-austins-growth-spills-over/269-
614326404 [https://perma.cc/LRE3-KANZ].
4. E.g., Forrest Wilder, What Climate Change Means for Texas in 11 Charts, TEX.
OBSERVER (May 8, 2014, 3:15 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/climate-change-means- 
texas-11-charts [https://perma.cc/T9DJ-P8KD].
5. See JJ Velasquez, Hays County Begins Recovery After Flooding Damages Public 
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These factors led Buda’s residents, nearby academic institutions, interested 
businesses, and local and state officials to explore an engineered solution 
to intensifying cycles of drought and flood and Buda’s steadily decreasing 
supply of freshwater.6  More specifically, in 2019 Buda implemented a
pilot “aquifer storage and recovery” program—a controversial water storage 
technique that is rapidly growing in popularity around the country.7  In
essence, aquifer storage and recovery is a technique that communities can 
use in order to capture excess surface water at times of relative abundance, 
treat this water on the surface to drinking water standards, and then inject 
it underground for storage so that it can be withdrawn during future water 
shortages.8 
Here, too, Buda has much in common with communities elsewhere in 
Texas,9 as well as in Colorado,10 Oklahoma,11 and several other states.12 In 
these jurisdictions, state legislatures, state agencies, and local governments 
have reformed state water laws, altered local land use controls, revised 
procedures for obtaining water permits, and taken a variety of other actions 
in order to make projects like Buda’s more commonplace.13  And federal 
6. See Yoojin Cho, Saving Storm Water to Manage Flood and Drought? Researchers 
Say It’s Possible, KXAN (May 14, 2019, 3:38 AM), www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/
saving-storm-water-to-manage-flood-and-drought-researchers-say-its-possible [https://perma.
cc/ZU7R-59R8].
 7. Katherine Jose, Buda Aquifer Storage Bill Signed into Law; Effective Immediately, 




 9. See, e.g., H.B. 655, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (amending, inter alia, 
section 11.153(b) of the Texas Water Code to streamline the approval process for aquifer 
storage and recovery projects). 
10. See, e.g., H.B. 18-1199, 71st Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018) (adding
section 37-90-107.6 of the Colorado Revised Statute, which authorized the state Groundwater 
Commission to create rules for the approval and regulation of aquifer storage and recovery 
plans); COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO’S WATER PLAN: COLLABORATING 
ON COLORADO’S WATER FUTURE, at 6-27, 6-129, 6-155, 9-44, 10-4, 10-5, H-11 (2015), 
https://drought.unl.edu/archive/plans/Water/state/CO_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYN6-
B2GH] (discussing the need for and efforts to support ASR projects in Colorado).
11. See, e.g., OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 785:32-3-2, :32-3-5, :32-3-6, :32-3-7, :32-5-
2, :32-5-3 (2019) (enacting new rules by which the Oklahoma Water Resources Board can 
approve and regulate aquifer storage and recovery projects).
12. See infra notes 42, 179–94, 302 and accompanying text (discussing recent revisions to
California’s ASR controls and recent California ASR projects). 
13. See infra Parts II, IV (discussing respectively the history of and the law governing 
aquifer storage and recovery projects). 
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agencies are now beginning to encourage aquifer storage and recovery as
a way to mitigate the risks posed by increased development, recurring 
drought, and climate change.14 
Such efforts to store excess surface water underground—whether they 
are at the pilot stage, as in Buda, or whether they have been part of local 
and statewide water planning for decades, as in many parts of California,
Florida, and other states15—fit a larger pattern.  In the past decade, water 
shortages and extreme weather events have put new pressures on American 
water law and water storage techniques.16 In response, regulators, legislators, 
and the popular press have frequently and increasingly touted the merits 
of underground storage of excess surface water to address the pressures on 
existing water supplies and to mitigate the damage caused by flooding events.17 
Artificial groundwater recharge techniques, including the aquifer 
storage and recovery approach adopted by Buda, have particular appeal in 
regions where low precipitation rates, impermeable surface geology, or both 
limit the rate of natural aquifer recharge.  This includes many states in the
American south and west, where slowly recharging aquifers filled with 
prehistoric groundwater represent a precious inheritance that has, until 
recently, seemed impossible to replace.18  To continue the analogy, if such 
aquifers are an inherited resource, and if precipitation and the resultant 
surface water flow represent current income, then artificial recharge techniques 
can be compared to retirement accounts, which prudent water users can 
build up in the present against future uncertainty and, perhaps, for future 
generations.19 




15. See infra Part II (discussing the history of aquifer storage and recovery in the
United States, including projects that run back decades in California, Florida, and other 
states). 
16. See, e.g., Tim Gray, As Fresh Water Grows Scarcer, It Could Become a Good 
Investment, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/
fresh-water-shortage-invest.html [https://perma.cc/AUE2-2QR7]; see also Jesse Reiblich
& Christine A. Klein, Climate Change and Water Transfers, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 439, 442, 
478–508 (2014) (providing a survey of state water allocation law and efforts to ensure 
adequate water supply in the face of climate change). 
17. See, e.g., Mark Gold, Opinion, Making Los Angeles Completely Water Self-
Sufficient Won’t Be Easy or Cheap. But It Can Be Done, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:15 
AM); Katie Riordan, Hurricane Harvey Sparks Renewed Push for Underground Water 
Storage Projects, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2017, 12:00 AM) (quoting Texas legislators arguing 
for more aquifer storage and recovery projects based on recent severe storms in the state). 
18. DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE WATER GOES: LIFE AND DEATH ALONG THE COLORADO 
RIVER 157–58 (2017). 
19. See id.
4
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These efforts are crucial because many communities in the United
States are running out of groundwater at increasing rates and without an 
alternative supply in sight.20  This means that without dramatic decreases 
in consumption or some new system of water savings, many parts of the 
United States will face unprecedented water shortages in the coming years.21 
To complete the analogy, without substantial increases in water savings 
through techniques like artificial recharge, there will be nothing left in the 
relevant accounts for many U.S. communities, which have been treating 
their groundwater supplies “like a spendthrift with lackluster accounting 
skills.”22 
Most readers will already know that an aquifer is nothing more than an 
area of permeable underground cracks and spaces through which groundwater
can move and rest, and that when water seeps down through surface precipitation 
to fill empty spaces in an aquifer, the aquifer is said to be “recharging.”23 
The catchall term “artificial groundwater recharge” applies to any human 
action designed to increase the water that naturally enters an aquifer, and
it will frequently be referred to in this Article as simply “artificial recharge.”
Artificial recharge can refer to traditional tools for recharging aquifers, such 
as canals drawn over porous surface spaces or irrigation furrows cut through 
impermeable surface areas.24  But artificial recharge can also refer to the
injection of water from the surface directly into an aquifer through pump 
and well systems.25  Similarly, managed aquifer recharge (MAR), a term 
once used more frequently outside the United States but increasingly used 
within this country, covers a broad array of human efforts to replenish 
groundwater, ranging from simple surface trenches to injection wells.26 
20. Andrew Amelinckx, Even Without a Drought, We’re Depleting Groundwater 
at an Alarming Pace, MOD. FARMER (July 30, 2015), https://modernfarmer.com/2015/ 
07/ogallala-aquifer-depletion [https://perma.cc/RUP9-KW8A]. 
21. See, e.g., id.
 22. See, e.g., id. (relying upon Kevin Dennehy, then-groundwater resources program 
coordinator at the United States Geological Survey, to complete the analogy discussed 
above).
23. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN FILE REPORT No. 93-643, WHAT IS GROUND 
WATER? 1 (2019), https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1993/ofr93-643/pdf/ofr93-643.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9FDF-76HK].
24. Artificial Groundwater Recharge, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://water.usgs.
gov/ogw/artificial_recharge.html [https://perma.cc/V8UZ-VRNH]. 
25. See id.
 26. E.g., WILLIAM M. ALLEY & ROSEMARIE ALLEY, HIGH AND DRY: MEETING THE
CHALLENGES OF THE WORLD’S GROWING DEPENDENCE ON GROUNDWATER 167 (2017). 
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As suggested above, much of the recent interest in artificially recharging 
aquifers in the United States has been fueled by recent periods of extreme
drought punctuated by short periods of relative abundance—and, sometimes, 
dramatic surface flooding—across many regions of the country.27  These 
extreme weather events have focused attention around the country on 
diminishing groundwater resources in recent years.28 Most obviously, in
places where the local water cycle has been marked by severe droughts, 
people have begun to recognize that short and unusually intense bursts of 
abundant surface water supply present opportunities to replenish not only 
surface reservoirs but also depleted aquifer levels.29  Indeed, some residents 
of traditionally drought-stricken states argue that even the most damaging 
surface flooding events can provide opportunities to recharge depleted aquifers, 
viewing every drop of floodwater that is not diverted underground or 
stored aboveground as a wasted opportunity.30 
Moreover, artificial groundwater recharge techniques offer obvious 
advantages to surface reservoir storage in relatively hot and dry areas,
even beyond their potential to help manage intensifying cycles of drought
and flood.  Surface reservoirs frequently lose substantial stored water to
evaporation, especially in hot and dry places; moreover, surface reservoirs 
frequently involve significant construction costs and disruption to both 
built and natural environments.31 In contrast, where suitable aquifer storage 
space is present, artificial recharge projects can be far more efficient, they 
27. See, e.g., MARK ARAX, THE DREAMT LAND: CHASING WATER AND DUST ACROSS
CALIFORNIA 92–94 (2019) (describing the interaction of flood and drought as motivating 
factors behind artificial recharge efforts in California’s San Joaquin Valley). 
28. E.g., id.
29.  Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Enhancing Drought Resilience with Conjunctive Use 
and Managed Aquifer Recharge in California and Arizona, 11-035013 ENVTL. RES. 
LETTERS 1, 1 (2016), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/3/035013/ 
pdf [https://perma.cc/NT9X-RBRS].
30. See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri, Harris County Eyes Putting Water to Better Use After 
Recent Floods, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 24, 2017, 10:15 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/science-environment/article/Harris-County-eyes-putting-water-to-better-use-1109 
5900.php [https://perma.cc/X254-FDBG]; see also Jim Carlton, Rains Expose a New 
Water Problem in California: Storage, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/rains-expose-a-new-water-problem-in-california-storage-1488835216 
[https://perma.cc/TL7L-HQG9] (noting that recent floods in California have sparked 
interest in water infrastructure investment including both surface reservoirs and artificial 
recharge projects). 
31. See, e.g., Noah S. Diffenbaugh, What California’s Dam Crisis Says About the 
Changing Climate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/
opinion/what-californias-dam-crisis-says-about-the-changing-climate.html [https://perma.cc/
AU39-V9MV] (arguing that increased demand, climate change, and aging dams and surface
reservoirs require “build[ing] infrastructure that enables us to use excess runoff to recharge 
groundwater aquifers”); Zaveri, supra note 30 (comparing recent plans for artificial recharge in
and around Houston to models from California’s Central Valley, Florida, and Washington). 
6
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are frequently cheaper to construct, and they may create far less 
environmental disruption than surface projects with similar capacity.32 
In contrast to the catchall terms of artificial recharge and MAR, the term 
“aquifer storage and recovery” (ASR)—the approach to water storage and
recovery recently chosen by Buda and the principal subject of this Article—
is much more specific, picking out a particular set of “unorthodox” techniques 
for storing excess surface water underground.33  ASR seems unusual to 
many because, unlike many forms of artificial recharge that rely, at least 
in part, on natural filtration processes to clean and transfer excess water 
from the surface to storage space in an aquifer,34 ASR systems directly
inject treated water into an aquifer for storage.35  And unlike other forms 
of artificial recharge that may also rely on direct injection through wells 
drilled into aquifers, ASR systems are built both to store and recover available 
water in the same surface location, frequently in the short- or medium-term 
future.36  ASR systems accomplish this by using the same well systems—
often referred to as “dual-use” well systems—for both injection of treated 
surface water and recovery of water stored in the aquifer.37  The dual-use 
nature of ASR wells, and the opportunity for relatively short-term storage 
and recovery times that such wells provide, are what differentiate ASR 
32. See Diffenbaugh, supra note 31.
33. Robert Glennon & Clark Taylor, Desalination Versus Duct Tape: (Dis)Incentives
to Securing Water Supplies, 108 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 56, 56 (2016). 
34. Although ASR seems unorthodox to many in this country, in other parts of the 
world it is more widely accepted.  ASR’s greater acceptance beyond the United States, its 
history within the United States, and its relationship to other forms of artificial recharge 
will be discussed at greater length in Part II. 
35. What Is Aquifer Storage & Recovery?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Jan. 15, 2013, 
12:44 PM), https://sofia.usgs.gov/sfrsf/rooms/hydrology/ASR [https://perma.cc/5NRC-
E2M9].  More specifically, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) defines ASR as 
“a water-storage technology” involving “storage of available water through wells completed into
aquifers, with subsequent retrieval from these same wells during dry periods.” Id.
36. Frederick Bloetscher et al., Lessons Learned from Aquifer Storage and Recovery
(ASR) Systems in the United States, 6 J. WATER RESOURCE & PROTECTION 1603, 1604 
(2014).
37. See id.; Claudia C. Faunt, Aquifer Storage and Recovery, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURV., https://www.usgs.gov/centers/ca-water/science/aquifer-storage-and-recovery?qt-
science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects [https://perma.cc/BCY3-5T36] (noting 
that artificial recharge and conjunctive use are catchall and interchangeable terms that 
“do[] not necessarily imply the active water storage activities used in ASR”). 
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systems from other forms of artificial recharge, even those that also involve
injection wells for water storage.38 
ASR is also unorthodox from a legal perspective—at least under American 
water law—because the potential for relatively short-term storage and
retrieval of excess surface water in available aquifer space challenges the
long-standing and problematic division between surface water rights and 
groundwater rights present in many American jurisdictions.39  Other types
of artificial recharge projects that involve natural filtration processes often 
have years- or decades-long horizons. Indeed, in some artificial recharge 
projects, the primary purpose of diverting excess surface water underground 
is to prevent saltwater intrusion, to prevent subsidence, or to address other 
side effects of a depleted aquifer, rather than storage for specific future 
uses or users.40  Such projects take on the character of public infrastructure
projects, with costs and rights to store and recovery shared broadly or 
channeled through utilities, and with recovery rights—if they are at issue 
at all—so widely dispersed or mixed in with broader access rights to the 
groundwater supply as to be relatively uncontroversial.41 
But the time frame for retrieval of aquifer-stored water in an ASR project 
is usually intended to be much shorter, and the beneficiaries of stored water
rights in an ASR project are usually more tightly defined than in many artificial
recharge projects. After all, the prospect of removing stored water from 
an aquifer relatively quickly and cheaply is part of ASR’s appeal, and many
ASR projects are confined to a specific community or town rather than a larger 
region.42 As a result, figuring out property rights in surface water and 
38. See Faunt, supra note 37; see also Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1604 
(noting that ASR projects “are different from the other aquifer storage strategies because 
the associated injection and recovery wells are generally the same wells”). 
39. For a short introduction to the foundations of American groundwater law and
the connection between these foundations and out-of-date scientific theories, see Zachary 
Bray, Texas Groundwater and Tragically Stable ‘Crossovers,’ 2014 BYU L. REV. 1283, 
1290–92. For a short introduction to the diversity of American groundwater law across 
various states and the fractured nature of groundwater and surface water law, see generally 
ROBERT W. ADLER, ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 215–79 (2d ed. 
2018). 
40. See, e.g., Katja Luxem, Managed Aquifer Recharge in California, AM. 
GEOSCIENCES INST. (Sept. 2017), https://www.americangeosciences.org/geoscience-
currents/managed-aquifer-recharge-california [https://perma.cc/9CE4-YRHE] (describing
subsidence prevention and saltwater intrusion, as well as water storage, as goals of MAR 
projects in Silicon Valley and Orange County). 
41. See id.
 42. Compare Jose, supra note 7 (describing ASR project in Buda, Texas), and
Christian E. Petersen & Kenneth Glotzbach, Aquifer Storage and Recovery for the City of 
Roseville: A Conjunctive Use Pilot Project, WATER ENV’T FED’N TECHNICAL EXHIBITION 
& CONF. 8634, 8634–35 (2005) (describing an ASR project in the city of Roseville, 
8
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groundwater that have passed through an ASR system is particularly important.
Unfortunately, figuring out such rights can be complicated, especially 
given the fractured nature of legal regimes for surface and groundwater in
much of the United States: American water law was formed by an antiquated
understanding of the hydrologic cycle, and as a result states have
traditionally had separate legal systems for surface water and groundwater
rights.43  For example, in many states, it has been difficult to protect an
ASR operator’s legal rights to treated surface water once it is injected into 
an aquifer, which obviously undermines the viability of such projects.44 
Despite the “unorthodox” technical and legal questions ASR poses, 
it offers many advantages over surface storage and even other forms of
artificial recharge.  First, ASR can be used where surface storage or other
methods of artificial recharge are not viable—for example, in places where
surface evaporation rates are very high, or where impermeable subterranean
barriers exist between the aquifer and the surface.45 
Second, ASR systems involve a relatively small surface footprint compared
to surface dam and reservoir systems as well as artificial recharge systems
that involve large surface recharge basins.46  The relatively small size and 
scalability of ASR projects can provide greater flexibility than surface systems 
for water managers and local planners as they design and implement water 
storage projects, and it can also substantially reduce the system’s cost as 
well as the disruption to the surface environment.47 
California), with Luxem, supra note 40 (describing MAR projects over large California 
water districts). 
43. See Bray, supra note 39, at 1290–94; see also Melissa K. Scanlan, Droughts,
Floods, and Scarcity on a Climate-Disrupted Planet: Understanding the Legal Challenges 
and Opportunities for Groundwater Sustainability, 37 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 52, 78–79 (2019) 
(describing some of the past difficulties associated with establishing property rights in 
aquifer-stored water in a number of western states).  The challenging nature of establishing 
recovery rights in water that passes through ASR systems will be discussed in more detail 
in Part III. 
44. See generally, e.g., Scanlan, supra note 43 (discussing, inter alia, the difficulties 
associated with determining ownership of water stored in aquifers based on the potential 
multiplicity of overlying landowner claims, and the conflict between overlying landowners and 
water storers). The challenging nature of establishing recovery rights in water that passes 
through ASR systems will be discussed in more detail in Parts III and IV. 
45. Danielle Kalisek, Is It Time for Texas To Welcome ASR?, 9 TXH2O 10, 10–12
(2014).
46. See Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1604 (noting, among other benefits, that 
the dual-purpose injection wells in ASR systems may allow communities to size infrastructure 
like treatment plants for average conditions rather than seasonal fluctuations). 
47. Id.
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Third, the relative accessibility of storing treated water in aquifers through 
dual-use wells means that ASR systems essentially combine many of the 
benefits of both surface reservoir systems and other artificial recharge
systems.48  In other words, at least in theory, it should be relatively easy 
to get water out of an ASR system, just as it is relatively easy to get water 
out of a surface reservoir—but at the same time ASR offers a way around 
the high costs, evaporation loss, and environmental disruption associated 
with surface storage. As a result, advocates for the increased use of ASR 
suggest that it may be uniquely well-suited to improve the “conjunctive 
management” of water resources—an approach to managing water resources 
in a way that recognizes the hydrologic connection between water on the 
surface and water underground.49 
The combination of these potential advantages of cost, size, scalability, 
ease of retrieval, efficiency of storage, and diminished impact on the surface 
environment work together to give ASR systems a straightforward and 
powerful appeal.50  At first blush, ASR can look like a silver bullet to a host
of related and serious water supply and environmental problems.51  But
there is something “deceptively simple” about this appeal: the basic idea 
can be explained very quickly, but the legal and technical aspects of ASR 
are complicated and involve real drawbacks.52  As a result, ASR deserves 
closer scrutiny, and it deserves to be scrutinized on its own, rather than as 
part of a larger portfolio of potential water storage techniques, which is 
how it has been covered in the legal academic literature to date. 
The importance of taking a close and hard look at ASR specifically is 
underlined by the terminological confusion around ASR and artificial recharge.
Part of the confusion around these terms is due to the fact that ASR has
become somewhat faddish. As a result, the boosters of some artificial recharge
projects that do not involve dual-use wells tout their projects as involving
“ASR,” even if they do not make use of dual-use wells; indeed, some boosters 
48. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional 
Conjunctive Management, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 308–09 (2011) (suggesting that in the 
future “ASR will often be an ideal means of off-loading the need to use a multi-purpose 
dam and reservoir for storage purposes”). 
49. See id.
 50. See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A
TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY 251–52 (2007) (arguing that “[r]eplacing some reservoirs 
with ASR projects” might reduce environmental problems and allow some water currently 
wasted to be reallocated to environmental restoration “without losing the ability to store 
water for human use in times of drought and during dry seasons of the year”). 
51. See SEAMUS MCGRAW, A THIRSTY LAND: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN WATER 
CRISIS 244–45 (2018). 
52. Id. The potential drawbacks of ASR and the complicated state and federal legal
environment for ASR projects will be explored in more detail in Parts III and IV. 
10
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slap an ASR label on projects even if they do not involve aquifer recharge 
at all.53 
This terminological confusion is bad enough in its own right, but it also 
makes it even easier for the public to draw incorrect conclusions about
fundamental aspects of ASR projects or to mistake ASR projects with very
different sorts of activities.  For example, in Denver, local officials and 
engineers associated with an ASR project had to emphasize repeatedly to 
concerned residents that “[t]his is not fracking,” and that the drilling equipment 
and wells associated with the project were for storing and recovering
water treated to drinking standards, rather than injecting chemicals for oil 
and gas exploitation.54  In addition, the legacy of legal uncertainty about
water rights associated with ASR has exacerbated public confusion and 
skepticism about ASR, even in jurisdictions that have recently changed 
the law to address this uncertainty.  As one water manager has put it, without 
education the general public and even some water professionals may think 
that ASR is nothing more than taking “perfectly good potable water and 
dumping it down a hole in the ground” without any reasonable legal safeguards 
for its recovery from competing nearby groundwater users.55  As will be 
shown in Part IV, some jurisdictions have lacked or may continue to lack 
these safeguards—but public skepticism about ASR exists even in jurisdictions 
where those issues are less pressing. 
Some measure of public misunderstanding about many ASR projects is 
understandable and perhaps even predictable, especially in light of the 
terminological confusion about ASR specifically and artificial recharge 
more generally in both the academic literature and in some statehouses. 
But this confusion must be addressed if ASR projects are to become as
widespread as ASR’s many defenders hope.  What is also required is a direct
53. See, e.g., Robert Glennon, Water Exchanges: Arizona’s Most Recent Innovation 
in Water Law and Policy, 8 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, Summer 2018, at 1, 6 (describing 
one recent Arizona project, called an ASR program by its supporters, as involving “a bit 
of smoke and mirrors” and a “legal fiction”). 
Issues related to this terminological imprecision, and the ways in which various actors 
can and have exploited this imprecision and related legal ambiguities, will be explored at 
greater length in Parts III and IV below. 
54. See Jay Adams, Big Drilling Rigs in Denver: It’s Not What You Think, DENV. 
WATER (Nov. 1, 2016), https://denverwatertap.org/2016/11/01/big-drilling-rigs-denver-
not-think [https://perma.cc/KB2C-X3TL] (attempting to address the top misconception
about a recent ASR project in Denver). 
55. Dave Rydman, Lessons Learned from an Aquifer Storage and Recovery Program, 
104 J. AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N. 52, 57 (2012). 
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and honest reckoning with the many problems associated with ASR projects 
in many parts of the country over the past few decades—and to do this, it 
is necessary to consider ASR in some measure of isolation from other 
artificial recharge techniques.
These problems will be discussed in substantial detail in Parts III and 
IV below, but a short summary here will be useful.  To begin, not every 
accessible aquifer with storage space is appropriate for ASR: some aquifers
contain chemicals or minerals that are not suitable for consumption, and
which can leach out of the solid material into the water as a result of the 
well drilling and injection processes.56  Well clogging is also a recurring
problem, which can be caused by mechanical failures, chemical or mineral 
contamination, or biological fouling, all of which can ruin both the specific 
ASR project as well as potentially contaminate portions of the underlying 
aquifer.57  Legal uncertainty, both about recovery rights in properly stored
water as well as liability for contamination of the underlying aquifer, is 
also a major problem that has prevented adoption of ASR in many 
jurisdictions and contributed to project abandonment in states where ASR 
has been tried.58  Finally, much of the information about the performance 
of specific projects or even all ASR projects within particular jurisdictions
is either incomplete or questionable, which means that it is difficult to 
assess how serious and how widespread the drawbacks surrounding some 
ASR projects have been and will continue to be.59 
In sum, it is critical to examine ASR on its own, washing away the confusion
surrounding its technical background, alleged benefits, potential downsides, 
related techniques, and above all its legal status.60  In the legal academic 
literature, ASR has frequently been lumped together with other types of 
artificial recharge61—techniques that are far less risky, and which present 
56. See MCGRAW, supra note 51, at 245. 
57. See, e.g., FREDERICK BLOETSCHER, AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N, AQUIFER
STORAGE AND RECOVERY 33–37 (2015) (suggesting that well clogging and subsequent
abandonment may be the most significant recurring technical problem for ASR). 
58. See, e.g., Scanlan, supra notes 43, at 78–79, and accompanying text (outlining
some issues caused by legal uncertainty around property rights associated with ASR); see 
also infra Part IV (gathering sources suggesting that legal uncertainty about both property 
rights and liability is the single greatest present problem associated with ASR). 
59. E.g., Sydney T. Bacchus et al., Fractures as Preferential Flowpaths for Aquifer
Storage and Recovery (ASR) Injections and Withdrawals: Implications for Environmentally 
Sensitive Near-Shore Waters, Wetlands of the Greater Everglades Basin and the Regional 
Karst Floridan Aquifer System, 7 J. GEOGRAPHY & GEOLOGY 117, 123–24 (2015). The problems 
with the existing literature about ASR—particularly the legal and technical problems associated 
with some ASR projects—will be discussed at greater length at the outset of Part III. 
60. Cf., e.g., Thompson, supra note 48, at 295–96 (discussing ASR as one of many
potentially valuable tools to enhance conjunctive management of surface and groundwater). 
61. See, e.g., Christina Hoffman & Sandra Zellmer, Assessing Institutional Ability 
to Support Adaptive, Integrated Water Resources Management, 91 NEB. L. REV. 805, 859– 
12
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less pressing technical and legal challenges.  While ASR has been considered
in isolation by scientists, engineers, the business community, and academics 
in other disciplines, this Article presents the first such sustained examination
of ASR in the legal academic literature.  And given how important—and
how confusing—the legal treatment of ASR has been to date,62 such an 
examination is overdue. 
Part II of the Article explores the history of ASR, distinguishing it from 
other forms of recharge and focusing on the evolution of groundwater law 
in the United States and the earliest jurisdictions to allow ASR projects.
Part III examines the problems with ASR, focusing on how gaps in the
law have stalled progress on existing ASR efforts and made some jurisdictions 
reluctant to allow even limited experiments with ASR projects.  Part IV
looks at the current legal landscape for ASR projects, paying particular
attention to the costs of complexity involved in multiple state law groundwater 
regimes, the disconnect between systems of surface and groundwater law
in many states, and the interplay between state water laws and relevant
federal controls, including but not limited to the Safe Drinking Water Act.63 
Finally, Part V offers suggestions for legal reform, with particular attention 
paid to changes in state law that might be made in jurisdictions with significant 
potential for ASR development. 
II. THE HISTORY OF ASR IN THE UNITED STATES
The relevant terminology is confusing and often used imprecisely, 
especially by lawyers whose misuse can be particularly problematic,64 so 
it may be useful to revisit this point before examining the history and 
development of ASR in the United States.  Artificial recharge is used as a
catchall term for processes used to replenish water in aquifers, perhaps to 
address problems of surface subsidence, saltwater intrusion, or for long-
60 (2013) (discussing an ASR program outside Wichita, Kansas, and lumping ASR together
with direct and indirect types of artificial recharge as examples of desirable integrated
water resources management).
62. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text; see also MALCOLM PIRNIE, INC.
ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF AQUIFER STORAGE AND RECOVERY IN TEXAS 101–02 (Tex. 
Water Dev. Board Report No. 0904830940, 2011) (“The principal challenges for ASR in 
the United States are primarily the legal and regulatory frameworks which, in many states, 
have not yet caught up with the application of this technology.”). 
63.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300k (2012). 
64. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
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term aquifer viability as well to replenish reserves of drinking water.65 
ASR, on the other hand, refers to a narrower and more recently developed 
set of techniques used both to store water in aquifers and to withdraw it 
from subterranean storage for human use in fairly short order—ASR systems 
can be designed for long-term storage, but they are frequently used more
like surface reservoirs than other types of artificial recharge.66 In other
words, all ASR is artificial recharge, but not all artificial recharge is ASR. 
The first and historically oldest type of artificial groundwater recharge
systems are surface recharge systems, which rely upon and attempt to enhance 
natural percolation and filtration processes in order to move excess precipitation 
underground.67 Despite the many different forms they may take, the common 
central idea behind surface recharge systems is an old one: for centuries, 
if not millennia, communities in arid environments have used surface 
trenches, pits, or tanks to catch excess rainwater and replenish surficial aquifer 
systems for drier seasons, instead of relying solely on surface reservoirs 
with potentially higher rates of evaporation.68  In addition to minimizing
the loss of stored water through evaporation, the process of gradually passing 
source water through soil and rock can remove or reduce contaminants 
present in the source water.69  The effectiveness of surface recharge systems 
at water purification obviously varies, depending on the time involved for 
recharge, the quality of the source water, whether or not the source water 
was treated prior to entering the recharge system, and the geological formations 
through which the source water is introduced to the aquifer.70 
Beyond surface recharge systems is another method of artificially recharging 
an aquifer, in which water is introduced directly into the aquifer through
65. E.g., 21 OFFICE OF GROUND WATER & DRINKING WATER, EPA/816-R-99-014u,
THE CLASS V UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL STUDY: AQUIFER RECHARGE AND AQUIFER 
STORAGE AND RECOVERY WELLS 1–2 (1999) [hereinafter UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL 
STUDY].
66. See Thompson, supra note 48, at 295–96 (comparing ASR systems to surface reservoir 
systems). 
67. See R. DAVID G. PYNE, AQUIFER STORAGE RECOVERY: A GUIDE TO GROUNDWATER 
RECHARGE THROUGH WELLS 11–12 (2d ed. 2005) (surveying ancient artificial recharge systems). 
68. Id.; see also ALLEY & ALLEY, supra note 26, at 24–28. 
69. See COMM. ON GROUND WATER RECHARGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GROUND
WATER RECHARGE USING WATERS OF IMPAIRED QUALITY 3–8, 97–131 (1994) (“Depending 
on the operation and the constituents of the recharge water and soil . . . filtration of 
suspended solids, parasites, and bacteria; sorption of trace elements, bacteria, and viruses; 
precipitation of phosphates and trace metals; biodegradation of organics; recarbonation of 
high pH effluents; and denitrification [may occur].”). 
70. See id. at 12. “It is useful to think of the entire artificial recharge operation as
a water source undergoing a series of treatment steps during which its composition changes,” 
dependent upon a host of different factors.  Id. 
14
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an injection well, without using natural filtration processes from the surface.71 
Unlike the surface filtration methods for recharging aquifers that have been
used for centuries in some locations, artificial recharge systems that make
use of injection wells depend on both advances in pumping technology and 
hydrogeological knowledge that were not available until the mid-twentieth
century. There are plenty of artificial recharge systems that use injection
wells but are not, strictly speaking, ASR.  In these systems, the injection
wells work only one way: they put excess surface water back in an aquifer
without relying on surface filtration.72  ASR is best thought of as a subset
of artificial recharge systems that use injection wells, and a relatively novel 
one at that—central to ASR is the dual-use wells for injection and retrieval, 
sometimes under relatively short time horizons. 
Compared to artificial recharge more generally, ASR is a relatively new 
approach to storing water in an aquifer, but this novelty is only relative, 
because ASR systems have been in use for decades.  The first ASR system
in the United States was developed in New Jersey in 1968 to provide both 
seasonal storage and recovery of treated drinking water in order to meet
peak summer demand with water reserved in wetter months.73  A second 
ASR project was then developed, also in New Jersey, followed by halting 
and eventually abandoned projects in Florida and Virginia in the early 1970s.74 
The growth of ASR remained slow through the 1980s and early 1990s, 
at least in the United States. Only about twenty ASR sites were operational 
in the United States by the mid-1990s,75 and much of this growth occurred
in Florida, where a number of sites were rapidly abandoned because of 
poor recovery rates or contamination from arsenic leaching.76  However, 
beginning in the late 1990s, ASR began to grow much more rapidly: by 
2005 there were more than seventy operational ASR projects in the United 
States,77 and by 2015 more than two-hundred ASR projects were either in
71. See Aquifer Recharge and Aquifer Storage and Recovery, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/uic/aquifer-recharge-and-aquifer-storage-and-recovery [https://
perma.cc/SJS5-NR2X].
72. Melissa Rohde, Janny Choy & Geoff McGhee, Recharge: Groundwater’s 
Second Act, STAN. WOODS INST. FOR ENV’T, http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/ground 
water/recharge [https://perma.cc/8QMQ-AKU8] (providing examples and diagrams of 
artificial recharge systems, including those that use injection wells). 
73. PYNE, supra note 67, at 19. 
74. Id. at 19–20. 
75. Id. at 20. 
76. BLOETSCHER, supra note 57, at 25. 
77. PYNE, supra note 67, at 20. 
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testing or operational in this country.78  Perhaps more importantly, many 
states have been revising their statutory and regulatory controls for ASR, 
in many cases with the intent of removing procedural complexity from the 
permitting and oversight controls relevant to new and ongoing ASR 
projects.79 From a legal perspective, the future for ASR is as bright in 
this country as it has ever been. But ASR projects can have many side 
effects—aquifers are fragile and remote things, which are easy to mess up 
and hard to clean up. Part III will explore ASR’s potential side effects, 
paying particular attention to the way that these technical problems influence 
and are influenced by the existing federal and state controls on ASR projects. 
III. THE POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF ASR
As noted in Part I, the basic ideas behind ASR are straightforward, and 
its merits, once explained, are relatively easy to understand.  Nevertheless,
it is also easy to mistake ASR wells for very different types of drilling 
activity—wells for hydraulic fracturing, for example.80  In addition, public 
confusion and skepticism about ASR have been fueled by difficult terminology, 
clunky acronyms, and the relatively new developments in drilling technology 
and hydrology that have made dual-use aquifer storage and recover wells 
possible. As a result, a lack of public awareness and the related potential 
for public confusion the most significant obstacles that work against more 
widespread adoption of ASR. 
But the confusion and uncertainty around ASR go beyond the terminology 
involved, the legal and technical novelty that surrounds many ASR projects,
or even the need for public education about water issues generally.  Beyond
these problems, the fragmentary nature of the academic literature on the
subject has created another significant obstacle to more widespread adoption
of ASR. For example, much of the information about the performance of 
specific projects, or even all ASR projects within particular jurisdictions, 
is either incomplete, unavailable, unpublished, or published in gray literature.81 
Moreover, regulatory agencies responsible for ASR oversight are sometimes 
tardy or noncompliant when academic researchers request information
about past permitting practices or the current performance of ASR sites.82 
And even when regulatory agencies comply with requests for information,
it can be difficult, if not impossible, to verify the claims that ASR operators 
make about recovery rates and compliance with the relevant water quality 
78. BLOETSCHER, supra note 57, at 19–21. 
79. See discussion infra Part V.
 80. See, e.g., supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
81. E.g., Bacchus et al., supra note 59, at 123–24. 
82. Id.
16
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standards for water that is pumped back up from ASR dual-use wells.83 
Some of these problems are not specific to ASR: in general, the collection 
of even basic data about groundwater quality and aquifer health is spotty 
in many parts of this country.84  But ASR’s relative novelty amplifies the
problems caused by the spotty nature of the available data, the uneven 
nature of the relevant academic literature, and, at least until recently, the 
dearth of useful metrics to study whether individual projects are succeeding 
or failing.85 
Data about ASR may be spotty, but there is enough information from a 
number of different states to review the many potential side effects that
ASR projects can cause, and the remainder of Part III will review these 
side effects.  In summary, the most serious problems associated with ASR
involve the contamination of water in the storing aquifer—contamination 
that can be caused or exacerbated by ASR in multiple ways, as Section III.A 
will demonstrate.86  While contamination of the aquifer may be the most 
serious side effect, the most frequent problem that emerges for ASR systems 
is clogging of the dual-use injection and recovery wells, which can occur 
due to physical particles in the injected water or biological growth that fouls 
well filters, as Section III.B will demonstrate.87 
Clogging and contamination, in turn, can lead to abandonment of the 
entire project, which in its own turn can exacerbate potential problems of
contamination for the underlying aquifer if the injection wells are not properly
plugged and sealed.88  Moreover, the costs of water produced through ASR— 
83. See, e.g., Sydney T. Bacchus et al., What Georgia Can Learn from Aquifer
Storage and Recovery (ASR) in Florida, in GEORGIA WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE 
2015, at 1, 4–5 (Robin John McDowell, Carson A. Pruitt & Robert Bahn eds., 2015) 
(noting that while the reported recovery rate for some studied ASR sites was 90%, the 
actual verified recovery rate for these sites was only 17%). 
84. E.g., Janny Choy et al., Groundwater Data: California’s Missing Metrics, 
STAN. WOODS INST. FOR ENV’T (2014), http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater/
metrics/index.html [https://perma.cc/KBQ6-GXXE].
85. See W. Benjamin Smith, Gretchen R. Miller & Zhuping Sheng, Assessing 
Aquifer Storage and Recovery Feasibility in the Gulf Coastal Plains of Texas, 14 J. 
HYDROLOGY 92, 94–98 (2017) (noting that public data for Texas aquifers is insufficient to 
apply success factors for ASR drawn from past academic studies and proposing a new set 
of success factors based on the available data). 
86. See discussion infra Section III.A.
 87. See Christopher J. Brown, Kirk Hatfield & Mark Newman, Lessons Learned
from a Review of 50 ASR Projects from the United States, England, Australia, India, and 
Africa, in CONF. PROC. OPENSIUC (2006), http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1040&context=ucowrconfs_2006 [https://perma.cc/CN8D-H3W2]. 
88. See, e.g., Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1620–21. 
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the costs of retrieving water from aquifer storage after its initial period of 
recharge—may vary tremendously, influenced by differences in the quality 
of both the source water and the storage aquifer, the amount of water 
treatment needed prior to and following aquifer storage, and the presence
or absence of chemical reactions while the recharged water is in aquifer 
storage. Each of these problems will be reviewed in turn, with special
attention paid to the ways in which these technical problems interact with 
the existing legal controls regarding the permitting and operation of ASR 
projects. 
A. Aquifer Contamination and ASR
Despite the age-old history of artificial recharge techniques around the 
world, any human intervention in an aquifer raises the possibility of unintended 
side effects. At the most superficial level, all forms of artificial recharge
require surplus surface water, and where surplus surface water is unavailable, 
recharge of all types will fail.  In addition, for surface recharge systems to
work, water must be able to percolate through the relevant subsurface 
geological formations to reach the relevant aquifer, which means that
surface recharge may be simply impossible in some geologic settings.89 
In other geologic settings, surface recharge may be possible, but chemical
reactions between the recharging water and the surface geology may release 
dangerous or toxic compounds that contaminate the aquifer even as it is
replenished.90 
In contrast to recharge systems that rely upon surface filtration, ASR 
operations are much less limited by surface geology.  Where surface filtration 
is difficult or impossible, ASR wells can punch through the problematic
surficial formations to reach the aquifer.91 And even where natural percolation
from the surface to an underlying aquifer is possible, in situations where 
potential contaminants exist at or near the surface, ASR may be much 
safer than other forms of artificial recharge. 
On the other hand, the absence of surface filtration and the reliance on 
deep wells to directly inject and remove water for storage can increase the
risks associated with ASR relative to other forms of artificial recharge. 
When something goes wrong with an ASR system, it often goes wrong 
directly in the aquifer itself, without any intervening geological formation 
or passage through an aquifer from injection to removal sites to remove
89. ALLEY & ALLEY, supra note 26, at 170–71. 
90. Id. at 171. 
91. See Rydman, supra note 55, at 53 (noting that ASR was more appropriate than 
surface recharge methods for replenishing the aquifers in Antelope Valley, California, due 
to clay formations and dense residential development that limited the aquifer’s ability to 
accept recharge by surface percolation in the areas of greatest need). 
18
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or dilute the problem. Contamination of the underlying aquifer can also 
happen more quickly with ASR than other types of artificial recharge—
though obviously contamination can occur equally quickly with other
types of artificial recharge that rely on single-use injection wells. 
ASR projects can pose a risk of contamination in at least two ways. 
First, water treated on the surface to meet the standards necessary for injection 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act92 may be relatively rich in oxygen
compared to its destination aquifer.93  This means that the injected water 
may release problematic trace metals from the confining geological 
material into the storing aquifer.94  And this, in turn, may contaminate the
water within the aquifer—including but not limited to water withdrawn 
from the ASR dual-purpose wells at times of surface need.95 
Given the geological diversity of ASR sites around the country, the list 
of potentially problematic trace metals found leaching into aquifers associated
with ASR projects is a long one, including but not limited to arsenic,
uranium, and mercury, with arsenic the most frequently occurring trace
metal contaminant.96  Part of the problem with this leaching contamination 
issue is that the relevant geochemistry is highly specific to the region and, 
often, the specific aquifer in which water is stored.97  For example, arsenic
and other trace metals have been the most significant leaching problem in 
Florida ASR projects, but high radon levels in recovered water have been 
particularly notable in Oregon and Washington, while high iron levels 
have been a problem in some New Jersey wells, and mercury levels have 
been a particular problem at some California sites.98  In a country as physically
diverse as the United States, this means that it has been and will remain 
difficult to apply single technical fixes across the country. 
92.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300k (2012). 
93.  Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1625.
 94. See id.
 95. Id.; see also RONALD S. REESE, REVIEW OF AQUIFER STORAGE AND RECOVERY 
IN THE LORIDAN QUIFER YSTEM OF OUTHERN LORIDAF A S S F (U.S. Geological Survey Water
Res. Investigations Report 2004-3128, 2004), https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2004/3128/pdf/fs-
2004-3128-Reese.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HAS-M5EN] (noting the potential for release of 
arsenic and radionuclides into ASR-stored water). 
96. See PYNE, supra note 67, at 276–77 (noting, in addition to the contaminants listed
above, the additional presence in some ASR projects of problematic levels of nickel, chromium, 
cobalt, and zinc); Brown, Hatfield & Newman, supra note 87 (noting the presence of 
manganese and radon contamination in some ASR projects). 
97.  Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1625. 
98. Id.
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Second, water injected through an ASR system may directly contaminate 
water in the aquifer, even if there is no problematic reaction with the aquifer’s 
confining geologic material.  This can occur in a number of ways as well. 
Even water treated on the surface may contain pathogens or contaminants,
sometimes referred to as disinfection byproducts, which can form during 
the treatment process as the disinfectant reacts with organic material already 
within the treated water.99 Such organic compounds may be relatively
common in sources of treated surface water that frequently are considered 
for ASR storage, including but not limited to treated effluent, recycled 
water, and stormwater.100  Disinfectant byproducts are a problem for water
stored on the surface as well, but they may degrade at much slower rates 
when stored underground.101  In addition, treatment of the injected water 
with disinfectants on the surface may lead to the formation of toxic compounds 
in the aquifer, when residual disinfectants remaining in the injected water 
react with organic compounds already in the aquifer.102 
Concerns about ASR-related aquifer contamination are neither abstract 
nor purely hypothetical.  Although ASR is a relatively new technology,
its future in some jurisdictions has already been threatened by aquifer 
contamination.103  The reasons for this are easy to see: when realized, the
threat of aquifer contamination undermines the rationale for ASR, destroying 
water reserves and contaminating the environment rather than preserving 
them. And the chilling effects of even short-lived aquifer contamination 
on ASR adoption may not be confined to the jurisdiction where contamination 
99. See MARY SHALEEN-HANSEN, WASH. ST. DEP’T ECOLOGY, PUB. NO. 17-10-035,
GUIDANCE FOR AQUIFER STORAGE AND RECOVERY AKART ANALYSIS AND OVERRIDING 
CONSIDERATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST DEMONSTRATION 10 (2017), fortress.wa.gov/
ecy/publications/documents/1710035.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV9K-XQM2].
100. Lucy K. Infeld, Sarah N. Munger & Rachel K. Roberts, Aquifer Storage and 
Recovery: Opportunities and Practical Considerations, A.B.A. (July 22, 2019), www.amercan
bar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/st/20190723-aquifer-storage-
and-recovery [https://perma.cc/3HDF-7YNW] (citing Aquifer Recharge and Aquifer Storage 
and Recovery, supra note 71). 
 101. SHALEEN-HANSEN, supra note 99, at 10.
 102. Rydman, supra note 55, at 53–54 (discussing concerns that treating injected
water disinfected with chlorine might lead to aquifer contamination, when residual disinfectant 
left in the injected water reacts with organic compounds in the aquifer, forming trihalomethanes 
(THMs)); see Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1625–26 (noting that disinfection by-
products (DBPs) can generate THMs as well as haloacetic acids in aquifers involved in
ASR projects, and that concerns about DBPs have shut down several ASR projects). 
103. E.g., R.E. Price & T. Pichler, Naturally Occurring Arsenic in the Upper
Floridan Aquifer, Southwest Florida: Implications for Aquifer Storage Recovery, in GROUND 
WATER/SURFACE WATER INTERACTIONS 388, 388 (2002), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
447a/227a41f1bf3aa95a36daed6cbbe409749af0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9M4-PAAZ] (“The 
future of ASR in Florida . . . is unclear because of the discovery of elevated arsenic (As)
levels during the recovery cycle testing of several ASR facilities throughout southwest
Florida.”).
20
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occurs. For example, ASR-related contamination of some aquifers in Florida
led to widespread skepticism about the technique in neighboring Georgia 
in the late 1990s, including a fifteen-year Georgia state legislative ban on
ASR projects,104 which will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV below.105 
Although Georgia’s ASR ban has since expired, opposition to ASR projects
in Georgia remains strong, even though pressures on Georgia’s existing
water supply have grown steadily more intense in recent years.106 
Some have argued that these chemical contamination issues may sideline
relatively few ASR projects outright, as they can be solved with treatment
of water either prior to recharge, upon withdrawal, or both.107  Others have
argued that contamination issues are most significant early in an ASR 
project’s cycle.108  Over time, at least for many ASR projects, both the 
contamination of the overall aquifer and problems with the recharged water 
in the zone of potential recovery near the ASR system’s wells can be managed 
and minimized, in part because scientists and engineers have learned from 
early struggles against ASR-related aquifer contamination.109  But others
have argued that the present risks of contamination are actually more significant 
than presently believed, at least in some parts of the country, because water 
injected through ASR systems may move through underexamined 
104. See Kristina Torres, Despite Critics, Georgia Lays Groundwork to Manage 
Aquifer Storage, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—
regional-govt—politics/despite-critics-georgia-lays-groundwork-manage-aquifer-storage/
ZJaFKa7XN0ol4QGaJiDcRM [https://perma.cc/YP2S-HSUE]; see also Bacchus et al., 
supra note 83, at 7–8 (arguing that Georgia should continue to reject ASR projects based 
on Florida’s experience with ASR-related arsenic contamination of aquifers, among other 
issues). 
105. See infra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
106. Torres, supra note 104; see GA. WATER COAL., 2014’S WORST OFFENSES AGAINST 
GEORGIA’S WATER (2015), https://gawater.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/03Floridan 
Aquifer.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZCG-UK3R] (arguing that Georgia’s legislature should
immediately adopt another ban against ASR, based on ASR-related aquifer contamination 
in Florida). 
107. See Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1625 (noting the treatment undertaken
by several different ASR projects to deal with a number of contaminants, and concluding 
that “[c]hemical leaching issues” and “[o]vercoming geochemical problems” is possible 
with treatment techniques as well as modifications to the injected water). 
108. See E.A. Antoniou, B.M. van Breukelen & P.J. Stuyfzand, Optimizing Aquifer
Storage and Recovery Performance Through Reactive Transport Modeling, 61 APPLIED 
GEOCHEMISTRY 29, 38–39 (2015). 
109. See id.
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subterranean fractures in the geological materials confining the relevant
aquifers.110 
The technical uncertainty over the risk of contamination for ASR is an
obstacle to ASR that is exacerbated by the legal uncertainty around ASR 
operators’ potential liability for subterranean trespass or other similar claims 
in cases of inadvertent aquifer contamination, as Part IV will discuss in
greater detail. Moreover, even if the most serious ASR-related cases of
aquifer contamination decline dramatically in future years, the costs of
treating aquifer contamination and the potential for greater liability exposure 
may deter many future ASR projects.  In addition, many aquifers are among 
the purest sources of water found in nature—at least in their natural state.111 
The prospect of potentially compromising the quality of such a resource 
in order to protect its quantity is often a difficult choice, at best, for many 
communities to make.  Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail below, 
the cost of successfully treating ASR-related aquifer contamination may
contribute to the abandonment of ASR projects, by increasing the cost of 
water ultimately recovered from ASR beyond alternative sources of storage 
and supply. But before turning to the unpredictable costs and the potential 
for abandonment of ASR projects, it will be useful to turn to another problem
that frequently occurs in conjunction with contamination of the wider 
aquifer—namely, clogging of the wells at the heart of the ASR system. 
B. Well Clogging and ASR
At least in the United States, aquifer contamination through injection of
treated surface water may be the most significant threat to existing and future 
ASR projects.112  But clogging of the dual-use wells used to inject and retrieve
water from the aquifer is probably the most common problem for ASR 
systems, both in the United States and around the world.113  This clogging 
can be caused by buildup of physical particles in the injected water or near 
the injection wells as well as air entrainment, which is simply the buildup 
of air bubbles in pipes and pore spaces in the aquifer.114  ASR clogging can
also be caused by the growth of microorganisms introduced with or fostered 
110. See Bacchus et al., supra note 59, at 117–18. 
111. See Infeld, Munger & Roberts, supra note 100. 
112. See Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1620 (surveying all ASR sites in the
United States and discussing aquifer contamination issues and well clogging as the two 
most significant issues facing ASR in the United States). 
113. Id.; see Hoon Young Jeong et al., A Review on Clogging Mechanisms and
Managements in Aquifer Storage and Recovery (ASR) Applications, 22 GEOSCIENCES J. 
667, 667–68 (2018) (noting that clogging and contamination are the “two major issues” 
for ASR development). 
114. See Brown, Hatfield & Newman, supra note 87. 
22
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by nutrients in the recharged water.115  These nutrients, and the teeming
microorganisms that come to feed upon them, can foul up injection and 
recovery wells as impermeable mats of dead microorganisms and slime 
grow up around filters in the system.116 
As one might expect, clogging has proved to be a persistent problem for 
many ASR projects because it is often related to aquifer contamination 
concerns. For example, clogging of the dual-use wells may be caused by
some of the same minerals that leach into injected water or by organic
contaminants in the injected water.117  Moreover, clogging of the dual-use
wells may exacerbate preexisting contamination issues, as both injected 
and recovered water pass through clogs that are themselves sources of 
chemical or biological contaminants.118  In addition, some of the most common 
fixes for certain types of well clogging—such as including a disinfectant 
in the injected surface water to deal with biological well clogging—can lead 
to aquifer contamination issues when that disinfectant reaches the aquifer 
119 and reacts with its confining geological materials.
Although clogging has been and remains a relatively frequent problem, 
several U.S. ASR projects have managed to solve it relatively easily, at least 
compared to contamination in the underlying aquifer.120  More specifically,
many of the clogging problems that have beset ASR projects in the United 
States have been managed with cyclical flushing of the well system.121 
But even where clogging problems can be managed relatively easily, the
techniques used to manage these problems can drive up the costs of operating
an ASR system even as they decrease the yield of acceptable water recovered 
from temporary aquifer storage. As will be seen below, cost and recovery 
issues that frequently lead to the abandonment of ASR projects are another 
substantial obstacle to the growth of ASR in the United States, and costs
115. PYNE, supra note 67, at 224. 
116. See Brown, Hatfield & Newman, supra note 87; see also PYNE, supra note 67, 
at 224–26 (discussing air entrainment and biological clogging at greater length). 
117. See, e.g., Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1620, 1624
118.  Id. at 1624. 
119. Id.
 120. E.g., Brown, Hatfield & Newman, supra note 87. 
121.  See, e.g., id. (noting that the desired frequency of cyclical back flushing to clear 
well clogging will depend on a number of factors, including the relevant geology of the 
aquifer). 
 23















     
   
   
 
associated with clogging have frequently been a cause of ASR project 
abandonment, even where technical solutions for the clogging exist.122  
C. Abandonment, Cost, and Recovery Issues with ASR 
Sections III.A and III.B have shown that aquifer contamination and well 
clogging are both significant problems in their own right, which may impose 
substantial costs on people who have no connection to the associated ASR
project, and for which there may be no good technical solutions in some 
cases. But even where these problems of contamination and clogging can
be managed, they may drastically alter the cost of water recovered from 
the relevant ASR system beyond alternative sources of storage and supply. 
In addition to the clogging and contamination issues discussed above—
and sometimes because of these problems—many ASR sites are abandoned 
or fall into disuse because the project is simply unable to provide enough
recovered water after injection to be economically competitive with other 
forms of water storage and supply.
This is an obvious problem for ASR projects, especially because estimating
the cost of water recovered from an ASR system is an inherently tricky 
business even in the best of cases, both for the technical reasons outlined 
in Part II and for the legal issues discussed below in Part IV.  In addition 
to the wide range of estimated costs associated with ASR projects, the actual 
costs of recovering usable aquifer-stored water from an ASR system are
often quite different than the initial estimates.123  There are many causes 
for these discrepancies between estimated and actual costs of recovery: 
unforeseen differences in the quality of both the source water and the storage 
aquifer; unexpectedly high amounts of water treatment needed prior to 
and following aquifer storage; and finally, unpredictable geochemical 
reactions while the recharged water is in aquifer storage.124 
Whether because of contamination or clogging or simply because of
incorrect estimates about the costs of water recovery, many ASR projects 
have been abandoned.  In fact, according to one recent survey, as many of 
a quarter of all ASR projects in the United States have been abandoned.125 
122. Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1620–21 (noting that out of more than two-
hundred ASR sites surveyed, clogging was cited as the main reason for the abandonment 
of eleven sites, and clogging was mentioned as a major problem at another twenty-nine 
inactive sites). 
123. See, e.g., Brown, Hatfield & Newman, supra note 87 (noting that in a survey of 
nineteen ASR sites, the costs per cubic meter of water recovered ranged from $0.34 to 
$9.27).
124. See Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1626 (noting that recovery cost and related 
treatment costs were cited as a reason to abandon 20 ASR sites). 
125. Id. at 1604–05. 
24
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Abandoned ASR projects are not evenly distributed.  Across the United 
States, Florida has the largest number of ASR programs of all types, active
or abandoned, and California, New Jersey, Arizona, and Oregon also have 
high absolute numbers of ASR sites.126  These states have very different 
approaches to groundwater law, different geology, and different water needs.  
What they all have in common is that they are among the leading jurisdictions 
in both total ASR sites and abandoned ASR sites.127  The high rates of ASR 
abandonment due to clogging, aquifer contamination, and uncertain recovery 
costs in states with little in common besides their relatively high early rates 
of ASR experimentation suggest that ASR abandonment will remain a 
persistent problem for many years. 
The uncertain costs of recovery and the potential for abandonment that
have dogged many ASR projects over the past few decades are particularly 
tricky problems to resolve because they often are not immediately apparent. 
Discrepancies between the cost of recovered water and the initial estimates 
may take months to become evident, and construction and design flaws or
faults in the underlying geology may not manifest for years.  Yet when
they do, they can ruin ASR projects and frustrate the local governments 
and water users who have invested not only in the project’s construction 
but in its apparent initial success.128  And as noted above, the costs of 
recovered water produced through ASR—the cost of retrieving water from 
aquifer storage after initial recharge—varies tremendously, influenced by 
differences in the quality of both the source water and the storage aquifer, 
the amount of water treatment needed prior to and following aquifer storage, 
and the presence or absence of significant geochemical reactions while 
129 the recharged water is in aquifer storage.
Despite these problems, many of ASR’s most enthusiastic supporters 
believe that the side effects of ASR are more manageable or less widespread
than they may appear, and that the present statutory and regulatory controls
126. Id. at 1617. 
127. Id.
 128. See Michael R. Blood & Elliot Spagat, Millions Spent on California Water-
Storage Plans That Leaks, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/millions-spent-on-california-water-storage-plan-that-leaks/2013/08/ 
24/7747a842-0cfb-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html [https://perma.cc/WCB4-8367]
(quoting local water managers who claim that the Las Posas Aquifer Storage and Recovery 
Project, which was supposed to “drought-proof” its service area, has been leaking injected 
water from its relevant subterranean storage zones). 
129.  Brown, Hatfield & Newman, supra note 87. 
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on ASR today are too restrictive.130  Indeed, some advocates for increased
ASR development argue that overly restrictive legal controls in fact pose 
a greater challenge to the optimal future use of ASR than the problems 
outlined above.131  Many of these ASR advocates point to the relatively 
looser legal controls on ASR projects in other countries, especially countries 
that rely on ASR more than the United States, to support their argument that 
this country’s restrictions on ASR are unnecessarily onerous and complex.132 
On the other hand, critics of ASR development believe that current controls
on ASR are far too lax, and that the technical problems outlined above far
outweigh the merits of most ASR projects.133  For such critics of current 
ASR practice, the statutory and regulatory limits on ASR projects should, 
if anything, be increased to protect fragile aquifers and public drinking 
supplies.134 Both sides of this argument and the larger current legal landscape
for ASR will be analyzed at greater length in the remainder of this Article. 
IV. THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR ASR
Part III explored the many technical challenges that ASR projects in the
United States have faced and likely will continue to face—challenges that 
have led to the abandonment of individual ASR projects and slowed the growth
of ASR in many jurisdictions.  Yet Part III also introduced the claim, one 
made by many of ASR’s boosters, that the legal obstacles to ASR’s growth
are more significant than the technical challenges outlined above. The legal 
obstacles to ASR’s growth in the United States have been significant, especially
in some jurisdictions,135 and in many ways they have been substantially related 
to the complexity of the legal controls over water use in the United States. 
But there are many types of decisions about water use, water rights, and 
development that are complicated in this country: overlapping local, state, 
and federal legal and regulatory regimes generally apply to many different 
130. See, e.g., PYNE, supra note 67, at 410–11 (“[W]hether or not the technical issues 
[associated with ASR] can be resolved economically at any particular site, the legal and 
regulatory issues can be complex, expensive, time-consuming, and of uncertain outcome.”). 
131. See, e.g., MALCOLM PIRNIE, INC. ET AL., supra note 62, at 101–02 (“The principal 
challenges for ASR in the United States are primarily the legal and regulatory frameworks 
which, in many states, have not yet caught up with the application of the technology.”). 
132. See, e.g., PYNE, supra note 67, at 411 (arguing that the present United States 
“regulatory framework endeavors to protect the nation’s aquifers against contamination, 
but does it in such a way that benign ASR practices . . . are difficult to implement,” and 
cautioning other countries against adopting the U.S. regulatory framework for ASR). 
133. See generally, e.g., Emily J. Markesteyn, Aquifer Storage and Recovery: A Bad 
Alternative, in GEORGIA WATER RESOURCES CONFERENCE 2015, supra note 83, at 1. 
134. See Bacchus et al., supra note 59, at 142–43 (arguing that substantial environmental
harm has been done in Florida as a result of the “lack of regulatory oversight for ASR”). 
135. See supra note 105 and accompanying text; infra notes 174–77 and accompanying 
text. 
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types of water use and development decisions.136  In other words, ASR is
not unique in this respect.  And there are other types of relatively novel 
water development techniques that implicate multiple and complicated 
legal controls in the United States, just as ASR does, but for which the 
legal complexity has become more manageable as American lawyers and 
academics have developed a greater understanding of the relevant technical 
and legal challenges.137  Finally, successful and long-running ASR projects 
have been developed in California and Texas—the states that historically 
have had both the most complicated and, perhaps, the most unfavorable 
legal regimes for such projects.138 
All of this means that those boosters of ASR who identify both legal 
complexity and substantive legal roadblocks as the chief obstacles to the 
adoption of ASR are right, at least up to a point: the law relevant to ASR
is very complex, and there have been substantial legal obstacles to ASR’s 
adoption.  But to suggest that the obstacles to the adoption of ASR are purely
or chiefly legal overstates the case.139 What makes ASR unusual at this point
in its evolution are not purely legal obstacles but a tangled web of legal and 
technical obstacles, complicated by substantial technical disagreement 
about the significance of these technical obstacles as discussed in Part III, 
and compounded by terminological confusion and lack of awareness among 
the broader public, as discussed in Parts I and II.  In short, the law governing 
ASR is complicated because ASR itself is complicated, and it is a mistake to 
suggest otherwise.
The state and federal legal controls on ASR primarily address a few recurring 
problems: who has the right to divert and treat surface water for subterranean
storage; who has the right to withdraw and use treated surface water stored 
136. E.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Introduction: Integrating Water Controls 
and Land Use Controls: New Ideas and Old Obstacles, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER 
LAW CONTROL LAND USE? 1, 34 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005). 
137. Cf., e.g., Michael Pappas, Unnatural Resource Law: Situating Desalination in 
Coastal Resource and Water Law Doctrines, 86 TUL. L. REV. 81, 83 (2011) (addressing 
the legal ambiguities raised by relatively modern desalination techniques in the context of 
property, water law, and coastal resource doctrines).  For an example of how desalination 
and ASR have been linked together by scholars as relatively novel tools to address 
environmental harms and water shortages, see, for example, ADLER, supra note 50, at 251 
(noting that technological advances in desalination, like ASR, may address existing and 
future water needs with less environmental impact than alternative approaches). 
138. See infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
 139. Cf. PYNE, supra note 67, at 410–11 (“Whether or not the technical issues [associated
with ASR] can be resolved economically at any particular site, the legal and regulatory 
issues can be complex, expensive, time-consuming and of uncertain outcome.”). 
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in an aquifer; and finally, who is liable for unintended harms to an aquifer 
that are caused or exacerbated as a side effect of ASR projects?140  Section 
IV.A looks at how recovery rights and potential trespass liability for ASR 
projects play out against the background of state groundwater law.  Section 
IV.B looks at specific and varying state responses to ASR, using California,
Texas, and Florida as examples of how states have tried to make ASR projects 
more feasible given the varied state groundwater law already in place in 
these jurisdictions. Finally, Section IV.C looks at federal law relevant to 
ASR projects, concluding with a short examination of litigation currently 
pending before the Supreme Court that might dramatically impact future 
ASR projects across the country. 
A. ASR and State Groundwater Law 
Depending on the jurisdiction, state groundwater law may limit ASR 
operators’ ability to pump recharged water out of subterranean storage.
Similarly, state groundwater law may also limit ASR operators’ recourse 
against surface neighbors who attempt to pump recharged water, injected
as part of an ASR project, for the neighbors’ own purposes.  The remainder 
of this Section looks at the background principles of state water law that
address these problems, before Section IV.B examines individual state law
approaches to ASR, focusing the specific statutory and regulatory systems
set up to control ASR in some states, as well as recent reforms made by 
some jurisdictions to accommodate future ASR projects. 
1. ASR, Recovery Rights, and the Roots of U.S. Groundwater Law
For much of human history, erroneous theories about the origins of
underground water and its relationship to surface water and precipitation 
held sway.141 Groundwater was thought to be independent from both 
precipitation and surface water,142 and this ignorance caused the law of
groundwater and the law of surface water to develop on separate tracks.  
As a result, at common law, courts applied the rule of capture to groundwater 
140. See, e.g., Infeld, Munger & Roberts, supra note 100 (listing problems of water
rights associated with the right to fill an aquifer, the problem of “[t]oo [m]any [s]traws” 
regarding rights to withdraw from the aquifer, and problems of water quality within the 
aquifer after an ASR project begins). 
141. Bray, supra note 39, at 1290–92; see A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 545 (6th ed. 2009) (“[C]omic but 
sad . . . [and] important problem in [early] groundwater law: initial allocation was based 
on myths rather than geohydrology.”). 
142. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 141, at 545 (noting that through the seventeenth 
century, scientists thought groundwater could not be “derived from rainfall because the 
supply was assumed to be insufficient and the ground to be too impervious”). 
28
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disputes, drawing from and in turn drawn upon by the common law’s 
approach to other subterranean fugitive resources.143  During the twentieth
century, most American jurisdictions realized the problems created by 
applying the rule of capture to groundwater, beginning with cases like Meeker 
v. City of East Orange.144 
In Meeker, a New Jersey court noted that the rule of capture was 
traditionally justified based on the historical “difficulty of proving . . . facts 
respecting water that is concealed from view”—a difficulty that by the
early 1900s was already “often readily solved” by advances in geology and
hydrology.145  The court in Meeker also observed that without the historic
difficulty of observing changes in groundwater, the entire justification for 
applying the rule of capture to groundwater “at once vanishes.”146  Accordingly,
the court in Meeker—like courts and legislatures in many other jurisdictions—
abandoned the rule of capture for groundwater in favor of alternative 
approaches.147 
Since the early twentieth century, as many jurisdictions began to abandon
the longstanding rule of capture in cases like Meeker, state groundwater 
law has varied widely across the various states.  There are a number of reasons
for this variety of approaches, including the historic scientific ignorance 
of groundwater and the hydrologic cycle, the traditional disconnect between
surface water and groundwater law, and the gradual departure from the 
rule of capture has caused state groundwater law to vary widely across
jurisdictions.148  Most jurisdictions rejected the rule of capture decades
ago, and even in Texas where it still persists, it must coexist with local 
143. See Bray, supra note 39, at 1291–93, 1294 (noting the connection between early 
groundwater law and the law of other fugitive resources). 
144. 74 A. 379 (N.J. 1909).  Meeker was one of the earliest cases to reject the
rule of capture, and certainly one of the most clearly reasoned and written such rejections, 
but it was by no means the very first such rejection.  For example, decades earlier, New 
Hampshire courts rejected the rule of capture in a line of cases relied upon by the court in 
Meeker. See Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 443 (Sup. Ct. 1870); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., 43 N.H. 569, 573 (Sup. Ct. 1862).  See generally Meeker, 74 A. at 626–27. 
145. Meeker, 74 A. at 384. 
146. Id.
 147. See id. at 385 (rejecting the rule of capture and holding “that the reasoning upon
which the doctrine of ‘reasonable user’ rests is better supported upon general principles of 
law and more in consonance with natural justice and equity”). 
148. See ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 39, at 278–79. 
 29









    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
   
 
 
   
      
   
    
      
and regional water control districts in part of the state.149  Those states that
first rejected the rule of capture, like New Jersey in Meeker, tended to 
replace it with something like the reasonability approach adopted in Meeker, 
though today states differ in the different ways that they define and regulate 
reasonable use of groundwater when conflicts emerge.150 
For example, the American rule for reasonable use, the first departure 
from the rule of capture, simply required that the groundwater withdrawn 
be put to a reasonable use on the overlying tract.151 Other states, beginning
with California, adopted a correlative rights approach, giving more protection 
to overlying landowners in times of shortage by emphasizing the need for 
sharing use rights when supplies are scarce.152  Still other states have
drawn upon section 858 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides 
a multifactor test to determine the relative reasonability of competing 
users.153  In contrast to these diverse approaches based on reasonable use, 
many western states, which had already rejected the common law riparian 
approach for surface water in favor of rules based on prior appropriation, 
a first-in-time rule with roots in mining law,154 simply applied that same
rule of prior appropriation to groundwater as well.155 
In sum, there are five more or less distinct doctrinal approaches that
different jurisdictions apply to groundwater conflicts: the old rule of capture, 
largely but not entirely rejected by most jurisdictions; three different 
approaches to reasonable use, known variously as the American rule, the 
correlative rights doctrine, and an approach drawing on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts; and last, the prior appropriation doctrine.156 This diversity
of approaches can create complexity for ASR operators—although the 
149. See BRAY, supra note 39, at 1286 n.9, 1289, 1296, 1300–11 (discussing the rise 
of groundwater control districts, the Edwards Aquifer Authority, and other local and 
regional groundwater control agencies in Texas). 
150. See generally ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 39, at 184, 189, 196–97. 
151.  Id. at 184. 
152. Id. at 189. 
153. Id. at 196–97. 
154. See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) (rejecting
riparian doctrine because “[i]mperative necessity, unknown to the countries which
gave [riparian doctrine] it[s] birth, compels the recognition of another doctrine in conflict
therewith”).  For a highly readable analysis of the roots of western prior appropriation law 
in the rules and ideology prevalent in western mining camps and frontier communities, see 
generally DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS,
AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012). 
155. See ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 39, at 178–79. 
156. See, e.g., id.; JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW & POLICY 908, 
908–13 (3d ed. 2016) (noting that state approaches to groundwater are “generally divided 
into the five categories” discussed above, but that “the law in any particular state is more 
likely . . . to employ elements” of multiple categories as a result of legislative and regulatory 
changes that “overlie and supplant the common law” doctrines discussed here). 
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doctrines are diverse at the state level, which mitigates some of the effort
and information burden on ASR operators, unless they wish to operate in 
multiple states. More importantly, however, under the law of some 
jurisdictions the relative water rights of both ASR operators and their 
neighbors may complicate ASR in a variety of ways, as will be discussed
immediately below and in the sections on California, Florida, and especially 
Texas law later in Part IV. 
2. ASR, Trespass, and State Groundwater Law 
An additional potential set of state law restrictions over ASR involve 
possible trespass claims that might arise from the unintended side effects
of ASR projects. At common law a landowner’s rights above and below
the surface estate were often referred to by the ad coelum et ad inferos
maxim, according to which the soil owner’s estate stretched above and below
the earth, to the heavens and the depths below.157  Accordingly, using aquifers
to store excess water through either artificial recharge generally or ASR 
more specifically might seem to violate the old ad inferos common law 
rule as, for example, water introduced underground by landowner/aquifer 
recharger Adam eventually migrates, over time, to a point underneath the 
surface estate of a neighboring landowner Beatrice.  The point is particularly 
important where recharged water carries contaminants or where it reacts 
with the confining geology to contaminate the aquifer—in such a case, Adam 
has tainted water underneath Beatrice’s surface estate. 
Given the relatively long history of artificial recharge in both the United 
States and elsewhere, the potential liability of Adam to Beatrice for trespass 
in such a case was presented by artificial recharge before the recent growth 
of ASR. Several courts that have addressed the issue of trespass in the
context of artificial recharge have concluded that a neighboring landowner
like Beatrice does not have a claim for trespass against a landowner/aquifer 
recharger such as Adam.  For example, in Board of County Commissioners 
v. Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch, L.L.P., the Colorado Supreme Court 
confronted exactly this issue.158 
The conflict in Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch began after the eventual
defendant in that case sought a conditional permit for an artificial recharge 
157.  As every former first-year student of property has learned—even if later forgotten,
or at least skipped over in the first-year property casebook—the full text of the maxim is 
cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos. 
158.  45 P.3d 693, 715 (Colo. 2002). 
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project involving six reservoirs for surface recharge and dozens of extraction 
wells for eventual transport to the distant city of Aurora.159  This led neighboring
landowners and the relevant county’s Board of Commissioners to file suit 
claiming that the defendants’ temporary storage of surplus water in the 
aquifer underlying plaintiffs’ surface estate constituted trespass under the 
ad coelum et ad inferos doctrine.160  The Colorado Supreme Court rejected
plaintiffs’ claim, holding that plaintiffs lacked property rights in both the 
underground water and the subterranean water-bearing capacity of the 
aquifer, and noting that similar claims also had been rejected by the Ohio 
Supreme Court and by an appellate court in Arizona just a few short years 
before. 161 
In addition to Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch and the cases it relies
upon, courts in California and Nebraska have reached conclusions almost 
as inhospitable to the possibility of trespass claims arising from artificial 
recharge.162  This is obviously good news for those who wish to decrease 
the legal complexity facing current and future ASR operators.  More specifically, 
such decisions are likely to help the adoption and development of ASR in 
new places: if state courts are relatively hostile to subterranean trespass 
claims, it will minimize the potential liability that ASR operators face under 
state law for inadvertent contamination of the relevant aquifer or other
unintended side effects. 
Not every recent case in which subterranean trespass has been litigated 
has proven to be so dismissive of such subterranean trespass claims, and 
therefore so favorable for ASR.  For example, in Environmental Processing 
Systems, L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., a case involving treated wastewater 
159. Id. at 696–97. 
160. Id.
 161. Id. at 701 (first citing Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (1996);
and then citing W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 
1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)). 
162. See generally Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal. Water
Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); In re Application U-2, 413 N.W.2d 290 
(Neb. 1987), superseded by statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-296(5), (6), as recognized in In 
re Applications T-141 Through T-146, No. A-93-193, 1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 485, *7. 
Developments in Nebraska’s groundwater statutes and subsequent appellate opinions
have not altered the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s reasoning in In re Application U-2 that 
is relevant to this Article.  In particular, the court recognized in that case that “underground 
water storage is not held in neatly confined reservoirs or bins, but is available as nature 
presents the situation to humans trying to avail themselves of something furnished by 
nature—the underground strata making water storage possible.”  In re Application U-2,
413 N.W.2d at 296. The court also recognized that it would be “completely unrealistic to 
pretend [that stored water] . . . will remain in storage precisely under” any particular lands; 
rather, the stored water will, “of necessity . . . move into the entire natural storage field,
following the laws of nature.” Id.  As a result, the court concluded that the relevant water 
project should not be invalidated “on that account alone.” Id.
32
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injected 8,000 feet into an aquifer that then migrated under a neighboring
landowner’s surface estate, the Texas Supreme Court repeatedly declined
to address whether an alleged trespass claim could proceed on such facts.163 
Subsequent parties have argued that the court’s refusal to address this
issue meant that it impliedly recognized the possibility of such a claim—
an argument that the Texas Supreme Court has since rejected, in Lightning
Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, L.L.C., without resolving whether or
not such a trespass claim could proceed on such facts.164  In sum, in jurisdictions
where the highest court has taken the approach followed in Park County 
Sportsmen’s Ranch, ASR operators may have little to fear about potential 
liability on non-statutory common-law trespass claims.  But in jurisdictions 
where the issue has not been litigated, or where the state’s highest court 
has declined to address the issue, some measure of liability risk on trespass 
claims may remain, although the definite trend in recent decisions from 
most jurisdictions is bearing against this risk. 
B. State-Specific ASR Controls 
Section IV.A immediately above examined the ways in which preexisting 
state law regarding groundwater rights and subterranean trespass might 
generally affect ASR operations.  In addition to these background principles
of law that are or might be generally applicable to artificial groundwater 
recharge, as artificial recharge generally and ASR projects more specifically 
have grown more common, many states have enacted legislation and
regulations that specifically target these methods of underground water
storage. In particular, many western states have statutes on the books that 
expressly authorize artificial recharge and, in some instances, protect at
least some of the water rights of groundwater recharge operators.165 
For example, the California Water Code expressly recognizes that storing 
water underground, including diverting streams and flowing surface water
163. 457 S.W.3d 414, 416–17 (Tex. 2015).  FPL Farming was argued before the 
Texas Supreme Court twice.  See generally 457 S.W.3d 414; FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. 
Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306, 314–16 (Tex. 2011).  Both times, the Texas Supreme 
Court declined to rule whether subterranean trespass claims could be made on such facts, 
unlike the court in Park County Sportsmen’s Ranch. See generally FPL Farming Ltd., 57 
S.W.3d 414; FPL Farming Ltd., 351 S.W.3d 306. 
164.  520 S.W.3d 39, 51–52 (Tex. 2017). 
165. See GEORGE A. GOULD, DOUGLAS L. GRANT & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 412–13 (7th ed. 2005) (gathering examples of various statutes 
from western states specifically authorizing and controlling artificial groundwater recharge). 
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to accomplish such storage, is a beneficial use of water so long as the water 
is stored and used for a beneficial purpose.166  In addition, if the entity storing
water underground is a public water district, the California Water Code 
also precludes anyone else from exercising any property rights in the stored 
waters.167  To provide two more examples, Arizona and Nevada statutes
both establish multilayered systems of permits for subterranean storage 
and recovery,168 and Arizona statutes specifically authorize, and sometimes
require, public entities to engage in artificial groundwater recharge.169 
State-specific legislation providing at least some protection to artificial
recharge operators is not confined to the Southwest: for example, Nebraska 
statutes recognize that underground storage is a beneficial use, authorize 
public water suppliers to apply for permits for artificial recharge, and provide
that such a recharger can levy fees for withdrawals of recharged water 
by others.170 
In addition to the artificial recharge legislation and regulation discussed
immediately above, several states have statutes or regulatory programs on 
the book that target ASR specifically, though given ASR’s relatively brief 
history these rules naturally tend to be of relatively recent vintage.171  For 
example, California’s State Water Board has promulgated discharge 
requirements for ASR projects that inject drinking water into groundwater, 
finding that ASR projects “will improve statewide water management by 
increasing local storage that will be responsive to the needs of local 
communities and environmental resources,” help fulfill the state’s “vast 
conjunctive use potential,” and reduce the strain on particularly stressed 
aquifers.172  In Texas, recent legislation has streamlined the relevant portion
166. CAL. WATER CODE § 1242 (West 2019).  In states with systems of surface or
groundwater rights that are at least partially based on prior appropriation, water used or 
appropriated must be put to a beneficial use.  See, e.g., ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 
39, at 121 (noting that as traditionally understood “beneficial use is the ‘basis, the measure, 
and the limit’ of an appropriative right” (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-3 (West 2019))). 
167. CAL. WATER CODE § 60351 (West 2019) (“To the extent that ground water
supplies are replenished under this act no person shall acquire any property or other right 
in the waters distributed by the district for replenishment purposes.”). 
168. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-811.01 to -815.01 (2019) (governing underground 
water storage, savings, and replenishment); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 534.0145 to .340 (2019). 
169. See GOULD, GRANT & WEBER, supra note 165, at 412. 
170. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233, -295, -299 (2019). 
171. See PYNE, supra note 67, at 378–80 (noting that in 2005, Arizona, Colorado, 
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington had ASR-
specific statutes or regulations on the books). 
172. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER QUALITY ORDER 2012-0010, GENERAL 
WASTE DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR AQUIFER STORAGE AND RECOVERY PROJECTS 
THAT INJECT DRINKING WATER INTO GROUNDWATER (2012) [hereinafter WATER QUALITY 
ORDER 2012-0010], http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_decisions/adopted_orders/water_ 
quality/2012/wqo2012_0010_with%20signed%20mrp.pdf [https://perma.cc/FPZ4-B3ET].
34
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of the Texas Water Code, making the approval process for ASR projects
more predictable and less procedurally complex, while directing the Texas
Water Development Board to evaluate additional aquifers that might be 
suitable for ASR.173 
In recent history, only the state of Georgia has banned ASR outright.  In 
2001, Georgia legislators enacted a moratorium on ASR based on concerns 
about potential contamination of the Floridan aquifer.174  As the chief 
proponent of the moratorium noted, “We don’t want dirty water in our 
aquifer. . . . Water is such a precious commodity, and when it’s messed 
up, it’s messed up—you can’t just go cleaning it up by pumping it through 
some sort of coffee filter.”175  However, the moratorium was ultimately 
allowed to expire in 2014,176 despite opposition from local and state 
environmental groups.177 
Although opposition to specific ASR projects and to ASR in general 
has arisen in other states besides Georgia,178 the end of Georgia’s ban
173. See infra Section IV.B.2 (reviewing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.155 (West 
2019)).
174. Craig Pittman, Georgia Leery of Aquifer Storage, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar.
28, 2001, at 6B. 
175. Robert Sargent Jr. & Ramsey Campbell, Well Bill Pumps up a Dispute, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (Apr. 10, 2001), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2001-04-10-
0104100186-story.html [https://perma.cc/2R4J-L8RM] (quoting Representative Anne 
Mueller); see Pittman, supra note 174. 
Opposition to ASR in Georgia was based in part on concerns about problems arising
with many of the ASR wells drilled in Florida—and subsequently abandoned—in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Georgia legislators and the Georgia public were also concerned about draft 
legislation in Florida, ultimately abandoned, that would have ended the requirement that 
water injected into aquifers through ASR be purified prior to recharge.  See Pittman, supra
note 174 (quoting Representative Mueller again, who argued that the draft Florida ASR
legislation was “dumber than dirt”). 
176. Mary Landers, Aquifer Injection Gets Another Look After Ban Ends, SAVANNAH 
MORNING NEWS (Aug. 3, 2014, 10:47 PM), https://www.savannahnow.com/article/2014
0803/NEWS/308039823 [https://perma.cc/P2DE-3VAN].
177. See, e.g., ALTAMAHA RIVERKEEPER & GA. WATER COAL., PROTECT OUR WELL 
WATER AND AQUIFERS: BAN AQUIFER STORAGE AND RECOVERY IN GEORGIA, http://www.
altamahariverkeeper.org/oldsite/events/pdf/Fact-Sheet-ASR.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CBU-
MM5E]; Chris Manganiello, Restore Protection for Floridan Aquifer, GA. WATER WIRE
(Feb. 20, 2015), https://gawaterwire.wordpress.com/2015/02/20/restore-protection-for-
floridan-aquifer [https://perma.cc/9G3G-EMAU] (urging legislators to vote for a revival
of the moratorium on new ASR projects). 
178. See, e.g., PYNE, supra note 67, at 400–02 (discussing opposition to ASR from
environmental nongovernmental organizations and some state legislators in Florida and in 
Kerrville, Texas). 
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means that those state statutes and regulations that do specifically refer to 
ASR are all, to some degree, permissive—but the degree of permissiveness 
varies by jurisdiction, and many jurisdictions have deliberately altered 
their groundwater doctrine and relevant permitting processes in recent
years to facilitate ASR projects. Space does not permit a full survey of 
the laws relevant to ASR in every state, but the subsections below provide 
windows into salient examples that have already been discussed repeatedly 
in this Article: namely California, Texas, and Florida.
1. ASR and California Groundwater Law 
California’s baroque system of common law, statute, and regulations 
probably presents the most confusing labyrinth of any state’s water law.
California’s water law system is the product of myriad departures from both
riparian and prior appropriation principles on the surface,179 the correlative 
rights doctrine applied to some of the most valuable and overdeveloped 
aquifers,180  long history of accommodating heavily engineered and a
solutions to surface and groundwater shortages.181  With respect to groundwater 
more specifically, the application of the correlative rights doctrine to aquifers 
that have been depleted for decades to serve heavily developed cities and 
some of the most intensively farmed agricultural areas of the country has 
traditionally frustrated regional and statewide water planners.182 
As one scholar has put it, California’s traditional approach to groundwater
control almost seems designed more for unpredictable high-stakes litigation 
than for prevention-oriented planning.183 And although episodes of past
intensive litigation have created bright-line and relatively consistent rules 
for the sources of groundwater at stake in those particular cases, much of 
the rest of the state’s approach to groundwater has been characterized by 
an inconsistent and frequently toothless patchwork of special management 
districts and local ordinances.184  Despite this confusing patchwork of
controls, there are several relatively longstanding ASR projects in California 
that were developed decades ago and that have been productively managed 
179. See  ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 39, at 128–33 (describing the history
and practice of the California doctrine for surface water rights, then locating the California 
doctrine within a larger taxonomy of dual-system surface water regimes that incorporate 
riparian and prior appropriation principles). 
180. See generally Scanlan, supra note 43, at 63–64.  As noted above, in theory the 
correlative rights approach protects overlying landowners the most in times of shortage, 
but its loose approach to reasonable use is often seen as an incentive for litigation.  See 
supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
181. See ARAX, supra note 27, at 49–53. 
182. Scanlan, supra note 43, at 81. 
183. Id.
 184. See id. at 82–83. 
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through the present, particularly in regions stressed by drought, intensifying 
agriculture, rapid development, or all three.185 
California’s water law remains a confusing labyrinth, but in the last
decade—spurred on by the pressures of drought, development, and climate 
change—state agencies and the state legislature have deliberately turned 
toward more systematic management of both ground and surface water
resources.186  These efforts at reform have included attempts to streamline
procedures for artificial recharge generally and ASR specifically.  Two of 
these reforms are particularly important for the future of ASR in California. 
First, in 2012, California’s State Water Resources Control Board (State
Water Board) issued an order finding that existing and future ASR projects 
could substantially improve state water management, especially for some
of the state’s most taxed groundwater resources in the Central Valley.187 
In addition to these findings, the 2012 order set forth a series of procedural 
reforms to streamline the review and permitting process and provide a 
general baseline of water treatment requirements for certain “low-threat” 
ASR projects.188  “Low-threat” is a key modifier: the State Water Board’s
2012 order does not automatically apply to existing ASR projects, and regional 
water boards retain authority and substantial discretion to regulate individual 
projects more stringently than the baseline provided by the order.189 In 
this way, the 2012 order provides greater predictability and procedural 
clarity to ASR operators without compromising on monitoring safeguards 
and other controls meant to prevent ASR’s potential side effects.190 
Second, in 2015, after decades of inaction at the state level while other 
western states implemented comprehensive statutory and regulatory 
approaches for managing groundwater,191 California passed the Sustainable
185. See, e.g., Aquifer Storage and Recovery, MONTEREY PENINSULA WATER MGMT. 
DISTRICT, mpwmd.net/water-supply/aquifer-storage-recovery [https://perma.cc/W9A3-7WPV] 
(describing the development from 1996 through the present of a multiphase ASR project); 
see also Petersen & Glotzbach, supra note 42 (describing an ASR project in Roseville, 
California, that dates back to 2004). 
186. See John J. Perona, A Dry Century in California: Climate Change, Groundwater,
and a Science-Based Approach for Preserving the Unseen Commons, 45 ENVTL. L. 641, 
642–43 (2015).
187. WATER QUALITY ORDER 2012-0010, supra note 172. 
188.  Id. 
 189. Id.
 190. See id.
 191. Perona, supra note 186, at 643. 
 37
BRAY_57-1_POST BRAY PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2020 6:50 PM    
 
 








    
 




     
  
Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).192 Perhaps most relevant for ASR,
the SGMA sets sustainability as a goal for the statewide management of 
groundwater193 and then empowers local Groundwater Sustainability Agencies
to manage surface property and water rights, treat and manage water, 
supervise surface water diverted for underground storage, and control 
groundwater extraction and allocation.194  In combination with the State 
Water Board’s 2012 order, the SGMA has provided both a measure of 
predictability for ASR approval, established a set of goals for which ASR 
will likely prove a useful tool, and created local bodies with authority and
responsibility to address both the potential benefits and the drawbacks of 
ASR projects. 
2. ASR and Texas Groundwater Law 
Texas’s system of water law is characterized by its longstanding retention 
of the rule of capture.195 As noted above, the rule of capture once formed the 
basis for groundwater law in every U.S. jurisdiction,196 but it now has been 
reduced essentially to Texas, and even there it has been modified.197  The
rule of capture is probably the state groundwater doctrine that is the least 
hospitable to ASR, because it provides ASR operators with no baseline of 
security in the water that they have injected for storage in an aquifer.  In 
theory, the rule of capture should apply some measure of simplicity and 
legal predictability to water law disputes—it is often called the law of the 
“deepest well” or the “biggest pump,” which is easy enough for any misbehaving 
kindergartner to understand—but as applied in Texas in recent years it has 
been subject to so many epicycles and administrative modifications that 
even this virtue of clarity has been lost.198 
192. The SGMA was comprised of three separate bills.  See generally Assemb. B.
1739, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); S.B. 1168, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2014); S.B. 1319, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).  For a good descriptive summary of 
the SGMA’s many provisions, see Groundwater: Sustainable Groundwater Management 
Act, U.C. DAVIS, http://groundwater.ucdavis.edu/SGMA [https://perma.cc/EP48-DR7H]. 
193. CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.1 (West 2019); see id. § 10721 (defining “sustainability 
goal,” “sustainable groundwater management,” and “sustainable yield” as objectives for 
state water management). 
194. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10726, 10726.2, 10726.4 (West 2019). 
195. Bray, supra note 39, at 1285–86. 
196. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text. 
197. See Bray, supra note 39, at 1299–311 (describing the evolution of rule of
capture and modifications to same in Texas groundwater law, including the growth of local 
groundwater conservation districts); see also ADLER, CRAIG & HALL, supra note 39, at 224 
(noting that Maine has also adhered to elements of the rule of capture “in spite of modern 
hydrology and other concerns”). 
198. See Bray, supra note 39, at 1286 n.9, 1299–311. 
38
BRAY_57-1_POST BRAY PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2020 6:50 PM    
 






   
 
  
   
 
 





[VOL. 57:  1, 2020] The Fragile Future of ASR 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
As a result, thanks to the rule of capture, the background of Texas 
groundwater law offers much less security to ASR operators than the 
groundwater law of other states. At the same time, the many exceptions 
to the rule of capture for groundwater as applied in Texas in recent decades
force many of the same costs of complexity on ASR operators as is found 
in other states. In other words, Texas would appear to offer the worst of 
all possible worlds, or at least all possible U.S. groundwater legal regimes, 
to the would-be ASR operator. 
But despite the unpredictable and inhospitable inherent nature of Texas 
groundwater law, several relatively long-standing ASR projects have flourished
in Texas—even before the recent reforms discussed below.  The story of
ASR in Texas begins in the mid-1990s, when the Texas legislature enacted 
House Bill 1989, creating express statutory authorization for ASR projects 
within the state.199  But by 2011, there were still only a handful of ASR projects
within the state, largely because of Texas’s longstanding adherence to 
principles of capture for groundwater generally.200  As a study commissioned
by the Texas Water Development Board observed, the inability of ASR 
operators “to protect the stored water with certainty” given the general
application to the rule of capture “reduces or compromises many of the 
benefits and, as a result, the economics of ASR utilization” in Texas.201 
In addition to the costs of reckoning with the rule of capture, until
relatively recently would-be ASR operators in Texas also had to contend 
with substantial regulatory complexity at the state and local level in order 
to win approval for the injection wells necessary to put water in an aquifer 
for storage.202 Texas groundwater law, influenced by the rule of capture,
has always been relatively permissive about pulling water out of the ground 
in order to put it to use.  But in contrast to the permissiveness traditionally 
associated with groundwater withdrawals in Texas, ASR operators—until 
recently—in many parts of the state had to win approval from a number 
of state as well as local authorities in order to inject water into Texas 
aquifers.203  Additionally, both state and local agencies frequently imposed 
199. MALCOLM PIRNIE, INC. ET AL., supra note 62, at 3.
200.  See id. 
 201. Id.
 202. See generally id. at 60–88 (discussing the legal obstacles to Texas ASR in
and prior to 2011, including the complicated state and local permitting process in Texas).
203. See id. at 77–82 (describing the permitting process for ASR operators in and 
prior to 2011, including the role of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and 
the role of local Texas groundwater conservation districts). 
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additional cumbersome special permitting requirements on ASR operators 
compared to other comparable water users.204  If capture poses a relatively
idiosyncratic problem for ASR in Texas, the problem of layered regulatory 
complexity—and, beyond the regulatory complexity itself, the absence of 
a consistent administrative path through these multiple layers of state and 
local review—has been, at least historically, a problem quite similar to the 
problem that regulatory complexity used to pose to ASR in California. 
Put another way, until very recently it made little sense to store water
in an aquifer in Texas, because there was substantial state and local 
regulatory complexity involved in getting a permit for the necessary
injection well—and then once the water was stored underground, it was 
hard for an ASR operator to do anything to secure rights in the stored
water against someone who might drill a bigger well or install a bigger
pump.  Those ASR projects that did exist in Texas against this backdrop
of capture did so by relying on massive infrastructure—attempting to ensure 
that they would have the biggest pump and wells around for the foreseeable 
future—or by relying on other unique political, judicial, or geological
conditions to overcome the rule of capture.205  Capture, in other words, can
be solved by at least some ASR operators who are willing and able to drill 
into deep enough aquifers, or acquire substantial surface estates, or wield 
enough political and economic power to deter competitors. But until 
recently, regulatory complexity seemed to be a more intractable problem. 
In recent years, however, Texas legislators and regulators have worked 
to address this problem of complexity by providing clear pathways for
ASR operators to both obtain permits and operate existing projects. Much 
like California, Texas has done this by singling out ASR and acknowledging 
its unique challenges and opportunities, rather than continuing to lump it 
in with other water uses.206 More specifically, in 2015 Texas passed ASR-
specific legislation, House Bill 655, in order to simplify and streamline 
the state permitting process for ASR-related injection wells, and to clarify 
the relative roles of both the relevant state agency, the Texas Commission 
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), and local Texas groundwater conservation 
districts (GCDs).207 
204. See id.
 205. See id. at 81–82. For a good and detailed discussion of ASR projects in Texas 
that have been developed to date, see, for example, Gregg Eckhardt, Aquifer Storage and 
Recovery, EDWARDS AQUIFER WEBSITE, https://www.edwardsaquifer.net/asr.html [https://perma. 
cc/45XM-HGJ8].
206. See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text (discussing California’s Water
Order 2012-0010). 
207. Mary K. Sahs, Water Law, 78 TEX. BAR J. 661, 661–62 (2015) (discussing House 
Bill 655).  See generally H.B. 655, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
40
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As modified by House Bill 655, the Texas Water Code provides that the 
TCEQ is the sole permitting authority for ASR operators, thereby streamlining 
the permitting process for ASR operators.208  At the same time, the modified 
statute still requires ASR operators to provide notice of the permit application 
and reporting of the well operation to the local GCD.209  It also allows the
GCD to regulate the operation if the operator exceeds the terms of the 
original permit.210 
In 2019, the Texas legislature enacted three more bills specifically 
designed to encourage ASR development, though each was more limited
than House Bill 655 in 2015.211  The most significant of these bills, House
Bill 720, expands the range of surface water that can be diverted into 
underground storage through ASR, expands the conditions under which 
surface water can be diverted, and provides incentives for surface water 
reservoir operators to consider ASR.212  Taken together with the 2015 
legislation, these recent bills underscore Texas’s attempt to streamline 
the procedural legal complexity that previously faced potential ASR operators, 
while continuing to provide a role for local input and feedback over state-
permitted ASR operations.  Unlike Florida’s approach, which will be explored 
below,213 these Texas changes have created a body of ASR-specific controls
tailored to the state, rather than a body of state law that attempts to control 
ASR along with desalination projects and waste disposal injection wells.  
208. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.153(b) (West 2019); see Sahs, supra note 207, at 
661–62. 
209. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.153(d), 36.453(a), (b), 36.454(b), (c) (West 
2019); see also Sahs, supra note 207, at 661–62. 
210. §§ 27.153(d), 36.453(a), (b), 36.454(b), (c); see Sahs, supra note 207, at 661– 
62. 
211. See, e.g., LEAH MARTINSSON, TEXAS ALLIANCE GROUNDWATER DISTRICTS: 
86TH LEGISLATIVE SESSION WRAP-UP 3 (2019), https://texasgroundwater.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/06/86th-legislative-wrap-up.pdf [https://perma.cc/DTD3-C7B7] (discussing and
describing House Bills 720, 721, and 1052). 
212. H.B. 720, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (amending TEX. WATER CODE
§§ 11.023, 11.157, 11.158, 27.201 (West 2019)). 
The second of the three 2019 ASR bills in Texas, House Bill 721, directed the Texas 
Water Development Board to conduct studies and a site survey for potential additional ASR 
sites in the state.  H.B. 721, 86th Leg., Res. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (amending TEX. WATER CODE
§ 11.155 (West 2019)). 
The third of the three 2019 ASR bills in Texas, House Bill 1052, authorizes a range of
state financial assistance for future ASR projects even if they are not included in the State 
Water Plan. H.B. 1052, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019) (amending TEX. WATER CODE
§§ 16.131, 16.145, 16.146, 16.182, 17.957 (West 2019)). 
213. See Section III.B.3. 
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And the result of these changes will likely be more ASR projects like
Buda’s.214  
3. ASR and Florida Groundwater Law 
In contrast to California and Texas, Florida has had a legal system 
relatively friendly to ASR for many decades.  And for most of the past few
decades Florida has had more ASR projects than any other jurisdiction,
although as noted above, many of Florida’s ASR projects have been
abandoned.215  Florida is also a much wetter state than California or Texas, 
though south Florida is prone to water shortages, and saltwater intrusion 
into depleted freshwater aquifers has been a problem for decades.216  Since 
the mid-twentieth century Florida’s approach to water law has been more 
thoughtful and comprehensive than California’s patchwork approach or 
the historical free-for-all of Texas water law.  For example, Florida—
a traditionally riparian state with respect to surface water rights—began to 
apply similar controls to both surface and groundwater uses as early as the 
1950s.217  This departure from the traditional distinction between surface water
and groundwater regimes occurred much earlier than many other states, 
many of which have continued to adhere to the common law’s distinctions 
between surface and groundwater rights.218 
Florida also adopted a systematic statutory approach to water rights earlier
than many other states, largely thanks to the drafting of the comprehensive 
and thoughtful Model Water Code at the University of Florida,219 which
214. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text. 
215. See Markesteyn, supra note 133. 
216. Richard C. Ausness, The Influence of the Model Water Code on Water Resources
Management Policy in Florida, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1987). 
217. See Christine A. Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & Richard Hamann, Modernizing
Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 415–16 (2009) (citing Koch v. 
Wick, 87 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1956)) (noting Florida’s early departure from the common law’s 
“failure to appreciate the interdependence of surface and groundwater”). 
218. See id.; cf. notes 39, 43, 147–48 and accompanying text (noting the longstanding
division between surface and groundwater law in many jurisdictions). 
219. In 1968, Frank Maloney, Sheldon J. Plager, and Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., published
Water Law and Administration: The Florida Experience. FRANK E. MALONEY, SHELDON 
J. PLAGER & FLETCHER N. BALDWIN, JR., WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA 
EXPERIENCE (1968).  This formed the basis for the publication in 1972 of A Model Water 
Code with Commentary, written by Maloney, Richard C. Ausness, and J. Scott Morris, 
which was intended as a proposed regulatory model for Florida as well as any eastern state.  
FRANK EDWARD MALONEY, RICHARD C. AUSNESS & JOE SCOTT MORRIS, A WATER CODE: 
WITH COMMENTARY (1972) [hereinafter A MODEL WATER CODE or MODEL WATER CODE].  
The Model Water Code in turn formed the basis for Florida’s Water Resources Act of 
1972. For a good account of the development and a robust defense of the merits of both 
the Water Resources Act of 1972 and A Model Water Code, see Klein, Angelo & Hamann, 
supra note 217, at 416–25. 
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formed the basis for the Water Resources Act of 1972.220  The Water  
Resources Act did not follow the Model Water Code in every respect: for 
example, the enacted statute failed to implement the model code’s provisions 
on water quality, which effectively split the management of water quality 
between multiple state agencies.221  But the Water Resources Act, like the
Model Water Code on which it was based, was particularly farsighted in 
many ways, including its establishment of water management districts 
based on watershed boundaries rather than political lines, its consistent treatment 
of surface and groundwater as connected resources, and its emphases on
environmental protection and comprehensive planning.222  Since 1972, 
Florida water law has continued to develop along the lines generally articulated 
by the Model Water Code and the Water Resources Act.223 
But challenges remain for Florida water law, many of which stem from
inconsistencies between the Water Resources Act and the Model Water 
Code on which it was based.224  For example, as noted above, the 1972 Water 
Resources Act effectively split the management of water quality and pollution 
control between multiple state agencies, and it also failed to give the local 
water management districts any direct pollution control authority, although 
the districts do take water quality into account when issuing permits.225 
This gap and the related overlap in Florida’s regulatory scheme have remained
to the present, leading to unnecessary regulatory complexity—sometimes
parties apply for multiple permits when the state Department of Environmental
Regulation and water management districts both wish to weigh in on
potential water quality issues.226  The split also creates the possibility of
inconsistency when planning and other nonregulatory activities at the district 
level fail to adhere to water quality standards encouraged at the state level.227 
Finally, the absence of direct pollution control authority at the local
water management district level can make pollution control efforts in Florida
220. 1972 Fla. Laws 1082 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 373 (West 
2019)).
221. Ausness, supra note 216, at 18–20.  As noted above, Professor Ausness was one of
the authors of A Model Water Code. 
222.  Klein, Angelo & Hamann, supra note 217, at 421–25. 
223. See id. at 425–29 (discussing changes to Florida water law since 1972 and
concluding that “the fundamental structure and policies of the 1972 legislation seem to 
have survived the test of time”). 
224. See id. (detailing additional challenges facing Florida water law).








   
 







   
 
    
 
     
      
   
less responsive to local concerns than efforts to address water shortages.
This creates a regulatory structure that may permit, in relatively short order,
a number of projects to address local water quantity issues, but which may
be slower to respond if those projects compromise water quality, even if 
a number of such projects affect water quality in similar ways.  And this, 
of course, is exactly what happened with the development of ASR in Florida
in the past few decades. As discussed above, Florida quickly became the 
nation’s leader in ASR projects—and several have been successful—but
many of these projects have been abandoned or posed contamination risks
that chilled the growth of ASR in Florida and in neighboring states.228 
In addition, and unlike California or Texas, Florida lacks systematic and 
ASR-specific rules—while Florida law has contemplated ASR projects for 
many years, Florida has not recently enacted any ASR-specific comprehensive 
regulations or passed any ASR-specific statutes.229  Instead, the Florida
statutes and provisions of the Florida Administrative Code that are relevant 
to ASR refer to other types of water treatment like desalination or reclaimed 
water,230 or permits for other types of underground injection.231  This has
created a relatively permissive approach for ASR projects—recall that 
Florida has by far more ASR projects than any other state.232  But this
flexibility has not provided ASR operators with much predictability regarding 
their rights and potential liabilities, nor has it provided much protection to 
Florida aquifers from the side effects listed above. 
228. See, e.g., Mike Coates et al., New Path to Permitting Aquifer Storage and Recovery 
Systems in Florida, FLA. WATER RESOURCES J., Oct. 2013, at 46, 46–47 (describing how 
the “mobilization of arsenic” in Florida aquifers as the result of past ASR projects has 
contributed to “an uncertain regulatory climate surrounding ASR” as well as many inactive 
or abandoned ASR systems); see also supra notes 123–28, 215 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2; see also BLOETSCHER, supra note 57, at 14– 
16 (describing state law relevant to ASR and noting which states have comprehensive ASR 
statutes or rules, such as California, and which have ASR projects but lack comprehensive 
and specific ASR statutes or administrative rules, such as Florida). 
230. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 180.06(3) (West 2019) (authorizing any municipality
or private company “[t]o provide water and alternative water supplies, including, but not 
limited to, reclaimed water, and water from aquifer storage and recovery and desalination 
systems”). 
231. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. § 62-610.466 (2019) (providing that ASR systems
must meet technical and permitting requirements set forth in Chapter 62-528 of the Florida 
Administrative Code, which governs underground injection control more generally). 
232. E.g., Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1617–18. 
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C. Federal Controls on ASR 
At the federal level, the injection wells at the heart of every ASR system 
are controlled by the Underground Injection Control program (UIC),233 a 
series of regulations administered by the Environmental Protection Agency 
pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).234  The SDWA, originally
enacted in 1974, was designed to protect groundwater quality by establishing 
maximum contaminant goals and levels that would lead to national primary 
drinking water regulations.235 As amended, it also requires that states prepare 
wellhead protection programs to protect areas near wells from contaminants.236 
It is frequently said to protect drinking water “from source to tap.”237 
The UIC regulations are designed to protect underground sources of
drinking water (USDWs).238  These are defined as any aquifer or potion 
of an aquifer that supplies a public water system with drinking water for 
human consumption.239 Most activity under the UIC regulations has focused 
on what the program defines as “Class II” wells, which are used for the 
production of oil and gas.240 
Neither the statutory provisions of the SDWA nor the regulations of the 
UIC program distinguish between injection wells used for artificial recharge 
projects or dual-use ASR wells.  Instead, the SDWA provides that “underground
injection” activities in general endanger “drinking water sources,” and are
therefore prohibited:
233. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144.1–148 (2018).  For a useful short summary of UIC insofar as 
it relates to injection wells used for artificial groundwater recharge, see BLOETSCHER, 
supra note 57, at 7–14; UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL STUDY, supra note 65. 
234.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300k (2012). 
235. E.g., TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 141, at 630.
 236. Id. at 630, 690. The EPA has no power to impose wellhead protection programs 
on states, but financial assistance for states that adopt such a program qualify for grants of 
50–90% of the implementation costs.  Id. 
 237. E.g., EPA, UNDERSTANDING THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 1 (2004), https:// 
cfpub.epa.gov/watertrain/pdf/sdwa.pdf [perma.cc/V7KP-UQ2Y].
238.  40 C.F.R. § 144.3. 
239. Id.  More specifically, 40 C.F.R. § 144.3 defines a USDW as a nonexempt aquifer,
or any portion of a nonexempt aquifer, “[w]hich supplies any public water system . . . [or] 
contains a sufficient quantity of ground water to supply a public water system” and which 
either “[c]urrently supplies drinking water for human consumption . . . [or c]ontains fewer 
than 10,000 mg/l total dissolved solids.”  Id. 
The Director of the EPA may exempt certain aquifers, which otherwise would qualify
as USDWs, under the procedures set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 144.7. 
240. TARLOCK ET AL., supra note 141, at 690. 
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[I]f such injection may result in the presence in underground water which 
supplies or can reasonably be expected to supply any public water system of
any contaminant, and if the presence of such contaminant may result in [a public
water] system’s not complying with any national primary drinking water 
regulation or may otherwise adversely affect the health of persons.241 
National primary drinking water regulations are defined in terms of
“maximum contaminant level goals,”242 which in turn are “set at the level 
at which no known or anticipated adverse effects on” health occur.243 
In addition to the controls on injection activity directly within the text 
of the SDWA, the relevant UIC regulations classify all “[r]echarge wells 
used to replenish the water in an aquifer,” all “[s]alt water intrusion barrier 
wells used . . . to prevent the intrusion of salt water into [a] fresh water 
[aquifer],” and all “[d]rainage wells used to drain surface fluid, primarily 
storm runoff, into a subsurface formation” as “Class V” wells.244  Thus,
the portion of the UIC regulations applicable to ASR—or indeed to any 
form of artificial recharge that makes use of injection wells—are those 
that refer to Class V wells. Other examples of Class V wells largely unrelated 
to artificial groundwater recharge include cesspools, dry wells used to 
inject waste into subsurface formations, and cooling water return flow 
wells.245  Indeed, most of the more than 600,000 Class V wells have nothing
to do with groundwater recharge generally or ASR specifically, but are 
instead relatively simple disposal systems for unwanted waste materials.246 
This legal connection between ASR dual-use wells and the waste disposal 
wells will appear again—it is implicated by recent litigation currently 
pending before the Supreme Court that will be discussed at the end of this 
Section. 
With respect to the SDWA’s reference to a baseline of compliance with 
any and all national primary drinking water regulations, the relevant UIC 
regulation specifies that no “injection activity [shall] allow[] the movement 
of fluid containing any contaminant into [UDSWs,] . . . if the presence of
that contaminant may cause a violation of any primary drinking water 
regulation” or otherwise adversely affect health.247  In other words, as will 
be discussed at greater length below, this regulatory interpretation of the 
241.  42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) (2012) (emphasis added). 
242. Id. § 300g-1(a)(3). 
243. Id. § 300g-1(b)(4)(A).
244.  40 C.F.R. § 146.5(e)(4), (6), (7) (2018). 
245.  Id. § 146.5(e)(2), (3), (5). 
246. Class V Wells for Injection of Non-Hazardous Fluids into or Above Underground 
Sources of Drinking Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/uic/
class-v-wells-injection-non-hazardous-fluids-or-above-underground-sources-drinking-water 
[https://perma.cc/W7LP-CUL8].
247.  40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
46
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SDWA works substantial limitations on the use of injection wells for
artificial recharge generally and ASR more specifically, in part because it 
does not allow injection well operators to rely on the natural dilution and 
decontamination processes in aquifers themselves.248 
The EPA directly implements the Class V UIC regulatory program in a 
handful of states as well as on most tribal lands, but states may obtain 
primary enforcement responsibility for injection controls over Class V 
wells if they meet the requirements set forth in the statute.249  As a result,
in most but not all jurisdictions, state agencies rather than the EPA have 
at least some responsibility for the UIC regulatory program and over Class 
V wells.250  These states, also known as “primacy states,” are those states 
that have been given primary enforcement responsibility to administer the 
UIC program themselves, using standards at least as strong as the federal 
program.251  In states without primacy, known as “direct implementation”
states, the EPA regional office directly administers the UIC regulations—
although the EPA can also bring enforcement actions in primacy states, if 
the relevant state fails to take an enforcement action after sufficient 
notice.252  Primacy states usually place regulation relevant to the UIC program
under the state environmental or water protection agency, but in primacy 
states where the relevant water or environmental agency does not handle 
water quantity or water rights issues, then the UIC authority may rest with 
the relevant oil and gas agency.253 
248. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) (2012) (prohibiting injections with contaminants 
if it might cause a public water system to fall out of compliance with any national primary 
drinking water regulation), with 40 C.F.R. § 144.12(a) (prohibiting injections with contaminants 
if the contaminant’s presence in the USDW might violate any national primary drinking 
water regulation). 
249. See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1 (2012) (providing the criteria for state primary enforcement 
responsibility). 
250. For a list of the various states’ and territories’ responsibilities for the UIC Program,
see generally EPA, STATES’ AND TERRITORIES’ RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UIC PROGRAM 
(2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/primacy_status_table_ 
revised_508c.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7PY-U982]. 
251. See EPA, AN OVERVIEW OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 44 (2002), https:// 
cfpub.epa.gov/watertrain/pdf/sdwa.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5AP-J2SD]. 
252. Id. at 44, 47. 
253. BLOETSCHER, supra note 57, at 14–15.  For a handy color coded series of maps 
of the various tiers of UIC primacy programs, see EPA, PRIMARY ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
FOR THEUNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROLPROGRAM, www.epa.gov/uic/primary-enforcement-
authority-underground-injection-control-program [https://perma.cc/J9WB-BNSL].
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The distinction between primacy and direct implementation means that 
the regulatory requirements that govern injection wells necessary for ASR 
differ significantly across jurisdictions, including those states where the
greatest number of ASR systems and wells exist.254  In general, control
over Class V wells is primarily a matter of permitting: the UIC regulatory 
program focuses primarily on whether or not an injection project should
be allowed to go forward.255  However, some states with partial or full
primacy over Class V wells depart from the federal requirements, imposing 
additional rules beyond the federal baseline.256  Depending on the jurisdiction, 
these enhanced state requirements might include requirements that the 
injected water remain in a particular zone of the aquifer, or that no unapproved 
interchange of injected water with water from another aquifer should 
257occur. 
All of this means that the most significant controls over ASR projects 
usually come from state agencies—which is consistent with the degree to 
which groundwater law has traditionally been confined to state rather than 
federal control. But there is one potential exception to this general trend—
an exception that is related to a case that is currently pending in front of 
the U.S. Supreme Court, County of Maui v. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund,258 and 
which has the potential to alter the future of ASR usage across the United 
States.259  At issue in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund are a number of injection wells 
owned and operated by the county for wastewater disposal.260 More
specifically, sewage is treated by the county at a wastewater plant, then 
injected into deep wells, where some of it mingles with groundwater, and 
much of it eventually reaches the Pacific Ocean.261 
The wells at issue in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund are not ASR wells; rather,
they are designed and operated for wastewater disposal, not for reuse of 
the water.262  Moreover, the potential contamination of the Pacific Ocean 
by this treated wastewater, rather than aquifer contamination, is the main 
substantive issue in the case.263  For example, the Ninth Circuit opinion
noted that the system injects roughly the equivalent of a permanently running 
254. E.g., UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL STUDY, supra note 65, at 2.
255.  BLOETSCHER, supra note 57, at 14. 
256.  Id. 
 257. Id.
258.  139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (mem.). 
259.  See, e.g., Infeld, Munger & Roberts, supra note 100 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s potential disposition of Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, argued on November 6, 2019, is a 
“variable that may affect the future of ASR usage in the United States”).
260. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 2018),
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garden hose of treated effluent into the ocean at every meter along an 800-
meter stretch of coastline.264 
What makes Hawai’i Wildlife Fund so potentially significant for future
ASR development is that the treated wastewater injection wells at issue in 
this case were properly permitted under the UIC regulatory program of 
the SDWA.265 The chief legal issue in the case is whether these wells also 
should be governed by the Clean Water Act (CWA)266 and the National 
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).267  Briefly, the Clean 
Water Act prohibits the “discharge of any pollutant by any person”268 and 
defines such discharge as the addition of from “any point source.”269 
A “point source,” in turn, is defined as any conveyance from which pollutants
are or may be discharged, not counting agricultural stormwater discharges 
or return flows from agricultural irrigation, but including any pipe, ditch, 
channel, tunnel, container, and so forth from which pollutants are or may 
be discharged.270  The most frequently litigated issue of the CWA’s 
application is its limitation to “navigable waters,”271 defined in the statute 
as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”272 
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit panel in Hawai’i Wildlife 
Fund held that the wastewater injection wells at issue were point sources 
that should be subject to the NPDES; that the operation of the wells and
discharge of the effluent without an NPDES permit violated the CWA;
and finally, that the county had fair notice of the CWA violation.273 The key 
argument for the county—an argument rejected by the Ninth Circuit—was 
264. Id.
265.  Infeld, Munger & Roberts, supra note 100. 
266. See Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
267. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012 & Supp. V 2017) (establishing the NPDES); NPDES
Permit Basics, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/npdes/npdes-permit-
basics [https://perma.cc/XC5T-MKYH] (last updated. July 12, 2019). 
268.  33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
269. Id. § 1362(12). 
270. Id. § 1362(14). 
271. E.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723–29 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(reviewing decades of litigation over the meaning of “navigable waters” under the CWA).  
See generally Michael P. Healy, Law, Policy, and the Clean Water Act: The Courts, the 
Bush Administration, and the Statute’s Uncertain Reach, 55 ALA. L. REV. 695 (2004) 
(discussing the history and framing of such litigation before Rapanos).
272.  33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
273. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 744–45, 749–52 (9th 
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (mem.); Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County 
of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 988, 993–95, 1004–05 (D. Haw. 2014), aff’d, 886 F.3d 737 
(9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (mem.). 
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that because the wastewater injections first passed through an obviously 
non-navigable aquifer before reaching the obviously navigable Pacific Ocean,
the CWA and therefore the NPDES should not apply.274 
This issue highlights the potential significance of Hawai’i Wildlife Fund to 
future ASR development across the country.  Although the injection wells 
at issue in this case are not ASR wells, if they are held to be subject to the 
NPDES because the water injected through them ultimately links up with 
navigable water, then many ASR wells also might be subject to the NPDES
permitting regime.  This would work a substantial expansion of federal 
oversight over future ASR projects.275  Whether or not this is a bad thing,
of course, depends on a number of factors, including but not limited to the 
degree to which one worries about aquifer contamination as a result of ASR 
projects.276  The merits and faults of such a potential expansion of federal
oversight over future ASR projects will be discussed along with several 
other issues in Part V below. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Part III of this Article examined the many technical problems with ASR. 
Part IV of this Article surveyed the legal landscape, including many of the
obstacles identified by boosters of ASR.  Part IV also pointed out the ways
in which many of these alleged legal obstacles are deeply intertwined with
the technical challenges that many ASR projects have and likely will continue
to face. For example, it is certainly true that the Georgia statutory ban on
ASR projects within that state was the greatest obstacle, legal or otherwise, 
to ASR development within that state until it was repealed.277  But of course
that legal ban was prompted by widespread technical failures with many 
ASR projects in the neighboring state of Florida.278  In other words, it is
impossible to understand the legal obstacles to ASR that existed in Georgia 
without understanding the many technical problems that existed and may 
still remain in many places. 
In Part V, this Article will review and advance suggestions for reform 
of the state and federal law relevant to ASR. Part V will also critically examine
a pair of related observations first introduced at the end of Part III: first, 
the idea that the biggest obstacles to future ASR development are legal 
rather than technical; and second, the idea that legal complexity is one of
274. Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 745–49. 
275. E.g., Infeld, Munger & Roberts, supra note 100; see supra notes 233–53 and 
accompanying text (describing the UIC regulatory program). 
276. See supra Section III.A. 
277. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
278. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text. 
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the chief legal obstacles that ASR faces.279 As the Georgia-Florida example 
illustrates, these observations can be literally true but also misleading: even 
when the legal obstacles to ASR in a particular jurisdiction amount to an 
outright ban, they are inseparable from the complicated technical challenges 
that many ASR projects face.
Before deciding whether the complexity of existing legislation and
regulation is, in fact, the specific greatest obstacle for future ASR development,
it is necessary to spend a moment unpacking “legal complexity.”  The 
notion of legal complexity is, unfortunately, almost as underexamined as 
the law related to ASR.  Legal complexity means many different things to 
different people, and relatively little work has been done to unpack these 
multiple meanings.280 
One key point that has emerged from the existing research on legal 
complexity is the distinction between legal standards and doctrines that 
are complex because they are inherently tricky or complicated and legal
systems that are complex because they involve many different people or 
institutions interacting in complicated and unpredictable ways.281  The  
first type of complexity is unavoidable in a world with tough problems, as 
complicated problems often require complicated rules to solve them.282 
Indeed, this feature of the world is not particularly legal, and it may be 
foolish to expect complex systems like ASR to be reducible to simple 
rules, legal or otherwise.
More interesting are the problems that arise from systematic legal 
complexity. Even if all of the legal rules relevant to a particular problem 
are relatively straightforward, the system itself may be unnecessarily complex 
because of complicated interactions between the people or agencies
administering the system.283  Here the claim that existing ASR law is
unnecessarily complex finds safer ground.  For example, recall that the 
substance of Florida’s statutory controls on ASR is not very complex at 
all—instead, ASR is lumped in with a number of other engineered techniques 
279. See supra notes 62, 131–32, 139 and accompanying text. 
280. See J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal 
Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191, 197 (2015) (noting how poorly we understand the causes, 
consequences, cures, and nature of legal complexity). 
281. Id. at 201–02. 
282. Cf. id. at 201 (“Few dispute that law is complicated; whether it is complex in
the systems context is another matter.”). 
283. See id. at 201–02 (explaining systems burdens and effects in the context of 
complexity science as they may be relevant to legal problems). 
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for addressing water shortages, such as desalination.284 But the procedural
and administrative system for permitting and then supervising ASR projects 
in Florida is relatively complex, with multiple state and local bodies whose 
respective roles are poorly defined.285 
Armed with this understanding of legal complexity, the remainder of
Part V will examine and advance a number of suggestions for reform of 
the legal controls on ASR.  More specifically, Section V.A will examine critiques 
and suggestions for reform of federal controls on ASR projects.  Section 
V.B will do the same for state controls on ASR projects. 
A. Suggestions for Reform of Federal Controls on ASR 
Section IV.C introduced the relationship between ASR, the SDWA, and
the UIC regulatory program.  Some enthusiastic proponents of ASR claim
that the SDWA and the UIC regulatory program work as an unnecessary
drag upon useful and efficient ASR projects.  More specifically, such
advocates for ASR believe that the SDWA and the UIC are too burdensome 
primarily because of their complexity: first, because the SDWA and the
UIC are complicated in themselves; second, and perhaps more importantly, 
because the rules governing primacy and direct implementation states impose 
substantial information costs on would-be ASR operators to simply learn
what the rules are for their desired project in the first place.286 
Still others argue that the SDWA and the UIC are overly restrictive, but 
for substantive rather than procedural reasons.  Pointing to the more lenient
regulation of ASR in other countries, these advocates for the expanded use of
ASR argue that it is a mistake to insist that water injected into an aquifer 
as part of an ASR project must comply with drinking water standards prior 
to storage.287  For advocates of ASR who are also critics of the substantive
standards of the SDWA and the UIC, part of the problem is that the standard 
of compliance with “national primary drinking water regulation[s]” at the 
heart of the SDWA acts as a one-way ratchet.288  Over time, tools for measuring 
contaminants grow ever more sensitive and precise, which in turn increases 
284. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
285. See supra notes 224–32 and accompanying text. 
286. See, e.g., Aquifer Storage & Recovery, GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.gwpc.org/programs/water-availability-sustainability/aquifer-storage-recovery 
[https://perma.cc/RF7S-QKHB] (noting that “regulatory complexity [is] an obstacle in many 
cases” for new ASR projects, due to the overlapping layers of federal and state controls
created by the UIC program and primacy states).
287. PYNE, supra note 67, at 374–75, 381–82; see BLOETSCHER, supra note 57, at 5– 
6 (noting that “[w]hile ASR can be an attractive alternative to aboveground storage,” the 
challenge of meeting the requirements for drinking water is an obstacle that must be addressed 
by regulatory agencies). 
288. E.g., PYNE, supra note 67, at 381–82 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) (2012)). 
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public awareness and concern about drinking water contamination.  This, 
in turn, means that drinking water regulations grow ever more restrictive 
and expensive to comply with, and because the SDWA’s substantive 
standards are tied to this ever more stringent standard, the costs of compliance 
will also steadily rise, perhaps beyond the means of some ASR operators.289 
It will be helpful to keep in mind the different types of legal complexity 
outlined above while evaluating these suggestions for reform.  The substantive 
critique—the idea that the SDWA and UIC are too complex because the 
standards they require ASR operators to meet are too complicated and 
burdensome—is the easiest to unpack.  To the extent that the UIC regulatory 
regime applying the SDWA’s “national primary drinking water” standard 
is complex in this respect, it is because it is an inherently complicated
attempt to solve a complicated problem. Safe drinking water is important; 
our scientific understanding of what might make drinking water unsafe 
can be expected to advance over time; moreover, fixing a contaminated 
aquifer is at best extremely difficult,290 so the cost of a complicated standard
may be worthwhile, even necessary, in order to prevent such substantial 
and complicated harm.
While the substantive complexity of the SDWA and UIC regulatory system 
for ASR projects is not necessarily unwarranted, in light of the harms
involved, there is some procedural complexity involved in the system as 
well. For example, the difference between primacy states and direct
implementation states is complicated and time consuming to explain, and
it results in jurisdictional legal variety.  This certainly imposes costs of 
procedural complexity in terms of the effort and information burdens 
needed to learn about and comply with the jurisdictional variations under 
the UIC program.291  In other words, there is certainly systematic complexity
here—but once it is explained, this complexity is reducible to a handy 
color coded map and table.292 And by taking on this complexity, the system 
can allow for variety among states to apply standards for ASR and other 
injection wells that may make regional or local sense.  The alternative would 
be a single national baseline for all relevant injection wells—even though 
geological and hydrological conditions vary enormously within some states, 
289. See id.
 290. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 216, at 2 (noting that groundwater pollution “is a 
matter of great concern because [it] is almost impossible to reverse once it has occurred”). 
291. See Ruhl & Katz, supra note 280, at 201–02 (discussing various costs of systematic
legal complexity). 
292. See supra notes 250, 253. 
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let alone across the country.293  Accordingly, the cost of imposing potential
interstate complexity on ASR operators who may wish to operate projects 
in multiple jurisdictions seems a modest cost to pay for this flexibility. 
A final area of potential complexity in federal law that might become 
more applicable to ASR projects is presented by the issues raised in Hawai’i
Wildlife Fund, and the possibility that ASR projects might be subject to 
permitting and other oversight under the NPDES and CWA as well as the 
UIC and SDWA if the Supreme Court affirms the lower courts’ holdings. 
Some boosters of ASR have criticized this potential outcome as a development 
that “would impose an ill-suited regulatory scheme” on ASR systems,
disincentivizing ASR operators from investing “in these environmentally
beneficial water management practices.”294  Part of the concern is simply 
the burden that any regulation imposes; another part of the concern is 
attributable to the nature of the NPDES program.  But part of the concern 
being raised by ASR boosters in response to the potential outcome of 
Hawai’i Wildlife Fund is related to complexity, above and beyond the 
substance of the CWA and the NPDES. 
This is obviously an example of procedural complexity in terms of the 
effort and information burdens involved—just keeping the alphabet soup 
of the relative acronyms straight is a little complicated.  Beyond the effort
and information costs involved, extending the NPDES system to UIC-
regulated injection wells carries the potential for additional costs of system 
complexity.  When multiple legal doctrines or regulatory regimes can apply 
to the same action, they carry the potential for system burdens that go beyond
the effort and information burdens noted above.295 
Readers can judge for themselves the odds that the current Supreme 
Court will render the potential outcome in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund outlined 
above.296  But even if this outcome comes to pass—even if future ASR activity 
is chilled by the sort of procedural complexity and system burdens contemplated 
above, then there are any number of relatively straightforward solutions 
that could be readily achieved.  For example, if the Supreme Court affirms 
the lower courts’ holdings in Hawai’i Wildlife Fund, then the CWA and 
SDWA could be rewritten or amended, providing a new and ASR-specific 
293. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
294. See Infeld, Munger & Roberts, supra note 100. 
295. See, e.g., Ruhl & Katz, supra note 280, at 201–02 (distinguishing between such 
oft overlooked “system burdens” of complex legal regimes and the “effort burdens” and 
“information burdens” associated with other types of legal complexity). 
296. County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019). The Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on November 6, 2019.  County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife 
Fund, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/county-of-maui-hawaii-
v-hawaii-wildlife-fund [https://perma.cc/335G-X6UC].  At the time this Article went to press,
Hawai’i Wildlife Fund remained undecided. 
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federal statutory and regulatory regime for ASR wells distinct from the 
wastewater and oil and gas injection wells.  Such an approach could preserve 
the state jurisdictional variety currently found under the UIC’s distinction 
between primacy states and direct implementation states297—under such
an approach, it would be important to provide clear procedural paths for 
any given project, not identical procedural paths for all given projects.  
And while such an outcome might seem implausible, it also seemed 
implausible just a few short years ago that California and Texas would 
create streamlined procedural paths for ASR while retaining much of the 
substantive idiosyncrasies of their state water law.298 
B. Suggestions for Reform of State Controls on ASR
Sections IV.A and IV.B reviewed the various state law controls that
apply or that might apply to ASR projects.  In particular, Section IV.A 
reviewed conflicts over recovery rights and potential trespass claims that
have been or might be associated with ASR projects in different states,
and which have been identified by some ASR advocates as potential obstacles 
to future projects.299  Most obviously, complicated state water rights systems 
can give competing groundwater users claims to water injected into an 
aquifer by an ASR operator—and if that operator does not have substantial 
confidence in its ability to withdraw the injected water, then its incentive 
to maintain or develop ASR projects also will disappear.300 
Accordingly, critics of certain state approaches to groundwater rights 
or trespass doctrines are surely right when they identify these approaches
as potential barriers to ASR. But it is important not to overstate the case:
both California and Texas, for different reasons, have perhaps the most
substantively complicated and, in the case of Texas, substantively inhospitable
systems of groundwater rights for ASR projects.301  Yet ASR projects have
been developed in both states and continue to be developed: the example of 
297. See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
 299. See PYNE, supra note 67, at 374–76 (discussing the ways that competing state 
law water rights claims can affect ASR projects in the absence of comprehensive state 
legislation or regulation); Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1626–27 (noting that complications 
related to competing state law water claims and recovery rights are an ongoing problem 
for ASR development). 
300.  Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1627.
 301. See supra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
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Buda discussed at the outset of this Article is but one such example.302  In
contrast, in Florida—a state with an enlightened water code,303 and one
which has long permitted ASR projects within its borders—over half of 
the ASR projects that have been developed have suspended operations or 
been abandoned due to contamination, clogging, cost issues, or a combination 
of all three.304 
In addition to the complications arising from the water rights and trespass 
doctrines that have developed in various state courts, some advocates of
ASR have also identified the alleged complexity of more comprehensive 
systems of state statutory and regulatory control as another substantial
barrier to future ASR development, at least in those jurisdictions where 
they exist.305  Accordingly, Section IV.B above reviewed these claims and 
the range of state statutory and regulatory approaches to ASR.  In particular, 
Section IV.B focused on the statutory and regulatory schemes in the key 
jurisdictions of California, Texas, and Florida. 
It may be easiest to think about the ASR-related statutory and regulatory 
complexity within states as representing a spectrum of approaches.306  At
one—procedurally complex—end of this spectrum are those states with a 
plethora of agencies, statutes, and regulations that each address one specific 
aspect of ASR control—such as surface water withdrawals, groundwater 
storage rights, and water quality or pollution issues.307  At the other— 
procedurally straightforward—end of the spectrum are those states with 
statutes and regulations presenting a streamlined permitting and oversight 
process, with one agency that has primary if not sole responsibility over 
ASR projects while also serving as the primary contact for ASR operators.308 
Critics of the alleged complexity of state law controls for ASR have a 
better argument to make on this point: the procedural complexity imposed 
on one end of this spectrum does impose real obstacles on the development 
of ASR, as the experiences of California and Texas before their recent
302. See, e.g., Jim Smith, What Is Woodland Public Works Working on Around Town? 
Here’s a List, DAILY DEMOCRAT, https://www.dailydemocrat.com/2019/04/03/woodland-
public-works-crews-involved-in-infrastructure-projects [https://perma.cc/4YZ9-Z7CF] (last
updated Apr. 3, 2019, 11:47 AM) (noting that two ASR wells in Woodland are currently 
injecting 2.6 million gallons of water per day into an aquifer beneath the community); see
also supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text (discussing Buda’s new ASR system).
303. See supra notes 217–23 and accompanying text. 
304. Markesteyn, supra note 133, at 1. 
305. See BLOETSCHER, supra note 57, at 12–13 (noting that the complexity of ASR-
related regulations and the variety of administrative bodies responsible for ASR projects 
within states means that even “carefully laid plans might be frustrated”). 
306. See, e.g., PYNE, supra note 67, at 380 (discussing the range of ASR-specific statutes
and regulations across various states). 
307. See id.
 308. See id.
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reforms show.309  So too does the Florida experience demonstrate this point: 
although the procedural complexity and the relatively lax permitting and 
oversight associated with this procedural complexity probably contributed 
to the burst of ASR development in the 1990s and 2000s, it probably also 
contributed to the problems of contamination and abandonment that beset 
many of these projects in the years that followed.310 
But the experiences of California and Texas after their recent regulatory
and statutory reforms show that states can move quickly from the procedurally
complex end of the spectrum to the procedurally straightforward end.  Each
of these states’ systems for groundwater control were among the most
procedurally complex in the country, both for ASR projects specifically
as well as other types of artificial recharge and sustainable groundwater
management more generally.311  And both states are now arguably models,
at least in part, for their procedurally streamlined approach to ASR permitting 
and oversight. 
California’s comprehensive revision of its overall approach to groundwater
controls already has been hailed as a model by others.312  But with respect
to ASR controls more narrowly, Texas’s recent statutory reforms may provide 
the best recent template for other jurisdictions to consider.  Whereas California 
has addressed ASR through comprehensive regulation,313 in the last half-
decade Texas has enacted multiple ASR-specific statutes that provide 
a procedurally straightforward path with a single responsible state agency.314 
In addition to eliminating unnecessary procedural complexity, these statutory 
reforms have also created safeguards to ensure that local agencies are kept
informed and have regulatory options if the scope of the project changes.315 
It is unusual, to say the least, for anything associated with Texas groundwater 
309. See supra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
 310. See supra Section IV.B.3; see also Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1617–27
(discussing results of survey, including growth and abandonment of Florida ASR systems). 
311. See Bloetscher et al., supra note 36, at 1626–27; see also Scanlan, supra note
43, at 83–85 (describing the historically disorganized state of California’s groundwater 
law, and concluding that prior to passage of the SGMA, California was an extreme outlier 
compared to other western states). 
312. Scanlan, supra note 43, at 80 (arguing that California under the SGMA can
“provide a model for other jurisdictions that face [water] scarcity, weather extremes, and 
population pressures”). 
313. See supra Section IV.B.1.
 314. See supra Section IV.B.2.
 315. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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law to be identified as a positive model for other jurisdictions to emulate,316 
but with respect to the state’s new and developing approach to ASR 
controls, it is appropriate, and other jurisdictions should pay attention.
VI. CONCLUSION
ASR is a relatively new technology, but as Part II has shown, it has been
around for decades in the United States, and it rests upon engineered
approaches to artificial recharge of aquifers that reach back centuries if
not millennia. Unlike such centuries old approaches to artificial recharge,
ASR’s progress has been marked by technical problems, especially in the
United States, as Part III has shown.  These problems of abandonment,
contamination, well clogging, and unpredictable recovery rates have kept 
ASR in a state of perpetual youth. Its time has been coming for decades.317 
But its actual development has been halting and uneven.
According to some of ASR’s boosters, these technical problems are a 
sideshow, because ASR’s growth has been checked chiefly by existing 
or potential future legal obstacles, especially the allegedly unnecessary 
complexity of the federal and state controls that have come to be applied 
to ASR projects.  These claims have some merit: for example, it is true 
that in many jurisdictions procedural complexity at the state law level imposed
substantial system burdens on ASR operators. But these claims also can 
obscure the degree to which legal obstacles to ASR’s development are deeply 
related to the technical problems that have blocked ASR’s development 
as well.
More specifically, while many have criticized the existing system of
federal controls on ASR projects as unnecessarily complex, much of this 
complexity may be warranted. For example, it is true that the relevant
“national primary drinking water” standard imposed by the SDWA can be 
both difficult to meet and is to some degree a perpetually moving target. 
But there are reasons for this substantive complexity, which find support 
in the technical complexity and high costs of ASR-related problems, especially
aquifer contamination.  And where unnecessary procedural complexity
does exist in state and federal law relevant to ASR, recent reforms enacted
in Texas and California suggest that there are multiple ways to reduce this 
problematic complexity while retaining meaningful permitting and supervisory 
authority over current and future ASR projects. 
316. See Bray, supra note 39, at 1285–87 (noting that most scholars consider Texas 
groundwater to be a tragic outlier). 
317. See generally Peter G. Scott, Aquifer Storage and Recovery in the Columbia
Basin: The Need for Action, 21 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 35 (2000). 
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After surveying the technical and legal issues that surround ASR in the 
United States today, it is clear that ASR has enormous potential to alleviate
the emerging groundwater crisis in many regions of the country. This
future is fragile: ASR has already had to overcome an outright ban in one 
state. But it is a mistake to claim that this fragility is purely or primarily
legal in nature, as some of ASR’s most enthusiastic advocates have done.
Such a claim obscures the side effects of some ASR projects, including
but not limited to aquifer contamination—which in the United States has 
been most problematic in Florida, the state with the most permissive legal
regime for ASR and the most ASR projects to date.  Moreover, as the
examples of Texas and California show, the law relevant to ASR in most
jurisdictions can be improved relatively quickly, without requiring wholesale 
revision of a state’s water law.  The future of ASR in this country will 
be informed by the degree to which other states adopt reforms like these—
and the extent to which such reforms can guide existing and future ASR 
operators to maximize the amount of water stored and recovered while 
minimizing the potential for contaminating the nation’s invaluable and
irreplaceable aquifers. 
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